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MULTICULTURALISM IN MEDICAL
DECISIONMAKING: THE NOTION OF
INFORMED WAIVER
Elysa Gordon*
Western1 bioethics and health law bestow paramount importance
on the principle of individual autonomy,2 which recognizes an indi-
vidual's right to determine matters of importance to his or her own
life. In health care, this means providing information to individuals
that enable them to make knowledgeable decisions about their
medical treatment and respecting their choices regarding medical
care. The value of autonomy in medical decisionmaking underlies
the American tort-law doctrine of informed consent.3
As reflected in the informed consent doctrine, the Western no-
tion of autonomy favors the individual over the community, self-
reliance over dependence, action over passivity, scientific rational-
ity over spirituality, and forthrightness over harmony.4 An une-
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Fordham University; M.S.W., 1991, Columbia Univer-
sity; B.A., 1989, Wesleyan University. The author thanks Nancy Neveloff Dubler,
Esq. and Professor Bruce Green for their guidance and support. The author also
thanks Steven Wexler for his encouragement and patience.
1. This Note defines "Western" as it is set forth in Anglo-Saxon liberal political
and moral theory and as embodied in American legal ideology and doctrines. See
generally BAILEY KULIN & JEFFREY STEMPL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 47-72
(1994); J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY (1992); SUSAN
MOLLER OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1979); BERTRAND Rus-
SELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY (1945); IRA KATZNELSON & MARK KES-
SELMAN, THE POLITICS OF POWER (1979); WESTERN CIVILIZATION: RECENT
INTERPRETATIONS FROM 1715 TO THE PRESENT (C. Stewart Doty ed., 1973). See also
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980);
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (E. Rapaport ed., 1978).
2. See infra notes 14-17 and 23 and accompanying text discussing the predomi-
nance of the principle of autonomy in Western moral and political theory and in the
U.S. Constitution.
3. See 1 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 409 (1995) ("The doctrine of
informed consent developed out of strong judicial deference to individual autonomy,
reflecting a prevalent belief in American jurisprudence that an individual has a right
to be free from nonconsensual interference with his or her person, and a basic moral
principle that it is wrong to force another to act against his or her will.").
4. The notions of self-determination, patient participation, and truthtelling are
evident in the earliest case law and by scholars on informed consent. See, e.g.,
Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)
("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body .... ."); Alexander Capron, Informed Consent in
Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 365-76 (1974)
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quivocal emphasis on Western values in medical decisionmaking,
however, erroneously assumes that all people approach health and
illness in similar ways. It overlooks that, in some non-Western cul-
tures, individuals expect and desire that others will make decisions
about their medical care and that individuals do not want to re-
ceive information on which such decisions will ultimately be
based.5 Persons identifying with non-Western cultures may be
more spiritual, more family or community sensitive, or more toler-
ant of authority and social stratification. They may value decision-
making processes that are less confrontational and defer more to
physician discretion. Imposing Western beliefs and practices on
non-Western patients may create deleterious health consequences
for them and risks viewing them as abstractions, stripped of the
cultural and social settings in which they live. It ignores the fact
(suggesting that informed consent protects individual autonomy and fosters rational
decisionmaking by the patient).
5. For the purposes of this Note, culture is defined as a significant factor guiding
the way individuals view, experience and interact with the world. See, e.g., E. LEACH,
SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 38-9 (1982) (citing noted anthropologist, E.B. Taylor's defi-
nition of culture as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art,
morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a mem-
ber of society."); R.M. KEESING, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 518 (1981) (defining culture as "systems of shared ideas, systems of con-
cepts and rules and meanings that underlie and are expressed in the ways that humans
live"); RACHEL E. SPECTOR, CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN HEALTH AND ILLNESS 68 (4th
ed. 1996) ("another way of understanding the concept of culture is to picture it as the
luggage that each of us carries around for our lifetime."); CECIL G. HELMAN, CUL-
TURE, HEALTH AND ILLNESS 3 (1994) ("culture can be seen as an inherited 'lens',
through which the individual perceives and understands the world .... "). This Note
proposes viewing culture, not in a vacuum, but as one important element influencing
how individuals may view the world and behave. It recognizes that cultures are heter-
ogeneous and that generalizations about particular cultural groups can lead to stere-
otyping and misuse. See id. at 4-5 (warning against the failure to view culture in its
particular context); DON C. LOCKE, INCREASING MULTICULTURAL UNDERSTANDING
6-11 (1992) (emphasizing the importance of remembering that there are differences
within cultural groups and providing ten elements to understand such differences);
STANLEY SUE AND THOM MOORE, EDS., THE PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 23-27 (1984) (ad-
vocating a culturally pluralistic view that emphasizes an individual's subjective culture
influenced by one's objective culture). In addition, culture must be comprehensively
defined to include not only ethnicity, but gender, religion, and socioeconomic status.
A layering of cultural systems provides a richer understanding of an individual's belief
system and guards against stereotyping. See, e.g., HELMAN, supra, at 4-5 (proposing
that culture must be viewed in its particular context influenced by its particular histor-
ical, economic, social, political, and geographical elements and citing important influ-
ence of individual factors such as age and gender, educational factors, and socio-
economic factors); Susan M. Wolf, Shifting Paradigms in Bioethics and Health Law:
The Rise of A New Pragmatism, 20 AM. J. L. & MED. 395, 401 n. 39-43 (1994) (noting
the rise of empiricism in bioethics coupled with an attention to the intersection of
race, gender, and economic status).
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that culture informs the perception of health and illness and
prescribes the parameters of medical decisionmaking. 6 Further, in-
sisting on a singular notion of autonomy, defined by Western val-
ues and applied to all individuals, fails to respect individual
autonomy in a different and fuller sense by diminishing an individ-
ual's right to decide how and by whom decisions of consequence to
his or her life are made.7
In the United States, the law regarding patient autonomy does
little to accommodate a competent patient's desire, for cultural or
other reasons, to limit his or her role in medical decisionmaking.
This Note argues that the law regardiig medical decisionmaking
must be reformed to accommodate patients holding non-Western
beliefs. It proposes a doctrine of "informed waiver" to serve as a
6. In their 1995 study, Leslie Blackhall et al., assessed the attitudes of two hun-
dred subjects from four ethnic groups and found ethnicity to be a primary factor re-
lated to attitudes toward patient autonomy. Blackhall et al., Ethnicity and Attitudes
Toward Patient Autonomy, 274 JAMA 820, 825 (1995) ("Although the patient auton-
omy model is founded on the idea of respect for persons, people live, get sick, and die
while embedded in the context of family and culture and inevitably exist not simply as
individuals but in a web of relationships."). See also Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient
and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and Obligations in The Physician-Patient
Relationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH & POL'Y 47, 54 (1993) ("Sickness is a test of
our values. For each of us, our response to sickness is unique, and thus the way we
express our autonomy is also unique."). This Note contends that a consideration of
cultural difference, or a multiculturalist approach, does not, however, require resort-
ing to cultural or ethical relativism. Cultural and ethical relativists suggest that moral-
ity is relative to the culture and society in which one is raised and lives and that
questions of right and wrong are always relative to, and determined, by culture. John
D. Arras & Bonnie Steinbock, Introduction: Moral Reasoning in the Medical Context,
in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE 1, 6-7 (John D. Arras & Bonnie Steinbock
eds., 4th ed. 1995). As a result, extreme cultural relativists risk justifying brutal and
intolerant practices, such as oppression and mutilation in the name of respect for cul-
tural difference. See generally id. at 7-8; Allen Buchanan, Judging the Past: The Case
of the Human Radiation Experiments, 26 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 25, 26 (May-June
1996) ("Cultural ethical relativism, strictly speaking, denies that there are any human
rights."); Sandra D. Lane & Robert A. Rubinstein, Judging the Other: Responding to
Traditional Female Genital Surgeries, 26 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 31, 32 (May-June
1996) (citing human rights scholar Alison Slack who identifies two opposing concerns,
the "absolute right of 'cultural self-determination' and the right of the individual not
to be subjected to a tradition or practice that might be harmful or fatal."). Multicul-
turalism, however, encourages critical thinking about the values of different cultures
and seeks multiple perspectives on ethical and moral issues within a moral framework
that respects human dignity and human rights. See Buchanan, supra, at 26 ("Human
rights, by definition, are the rights we have simply by virtue of our humanity, regard-
less of differences in our cultures, and regardless of when or where we live.").
7. See Pellegrino, supra note 6, at 48-9 ("To obstruct the capacity for autonomy is
to assault an essential part of a person's humanity, because the choices we make are
so much an expression of our membership in the human community, of who we are or
what we want to be as individual members of that community. Human beings are
owed respect for their autonomy because they have an inherent dignity.").
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counterweight to the Western biases now present in the informed
consent doctrine and to enable health care providers to respect
their patients' autonomy in the fullest sense. Part I defines the
Western notion of patient autonomy. First, it describes the princi-
ple of autonomy rooted in Western traditions of self-governance
and personal and political freedom of choice. Second, it discusses
the legal vision of autonomy as expressed by American courts in
the doctrine of informed consent and the laws on medical decision-
making. Part II illustrates that the values reflected in the Western
definition of autonomy do not hold true for all patients, and may
even prove harmful for some patients' welfare. Part III proposes a
framework whereby culture might be incorporated into a definition
of autonomy in legal and medical practice. It examines how the
law and health care providers might accommodate cultural differ-
ence and concludes that a notion of informed waiver is the best
compromise for enabling patients to forgo Western-defined ap-
proaches to medical decisionmaking.
I. A Western Conception of Autonomy
Culture has long been recognized in the social sciences as a pre-
dominant factor influencing perceptions and expressions of health
and illness. Western cultural values shaped the notion of patient
autonomy in American legal and medical doctrine and practice.
One commentator writes, "we learn from our own cultural and eth-
nic backgrounds how to be healthy, how to recognize illness and
how to be ill."8 Cultural values may be further refined by the over-
lapping "culture" of gender, class, religion, and even sexual orien-
tation. 9 For example, a culture may inculcate more emotional or
passive decisionmaking for women 10 and those with diminished
8. SPECTOR, supra note 5, at 65. See also HELMAN, supra note 5, at 4 (arguing
that individuals' beliefs and practices relating to illness and health are a central fea-
ture of the culture).
9. See Wolf, supra note 5. New works examine this layering in the medical con-
text. See, e.g., IT JUST AIN'T FAIR: THE ETHICS OF HEALTH CARE FOR AFRICAN
AMERICANS (Annette Dula & Sara Goering eds. 1994) (race-attentive essays); FEMI-
NIST PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS (Helen Bequaert Holmes & Laura M. Purdy
eds. 1992) (gender-attentive essays). For a well-written analysis of the intersection of
race, poverty, and gender, see Dorothy E. Roberts, The Future of Reproductive
Choice for Poor Women and Women of Color, 12 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 59 (1990).
For the role of religion in one's perception of health and illness, see SPECTOR, supra
note 5, at 135-168.
10. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) (proposing
that women's motives, moral commitments and psychological development are differ-
ent from men); HELMAN, supra note 5, at 146-156, 149 (examining anthropological
research on "gender cultures" and the relationship between gender and health)
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economic resources.1 Fear of discrimination and actual or per-
ceived powerlessness may promote greater distrust of one's ability
to participate equally in medical treatment. 12 Moreover, educa-
tional and language barriers may inhibit active participation in
medical decisionmaking as well as augment dependence on family
and community members. 13 Members of a particular culture may
share all or part of their cultural norms, and may cast off or modify
these values when they find themselves in a Western culture. Polit-
ical, economic, and social forces may alter the way culture is trans-
mitted and maintained among generations. However, many
elements of culture are unconsciously and consciously passed from
one generation to the next.
A. The Moral Vision of Autonomy - Respect for Persons
In Western moral and political theory, respect for autonomy is a
guiding principle and refers to personal self-governance that is free
from control or interference by others.' 4 Autonomy acknowledges
that all human beings have a capacity for moral dignity and that
those who possess moral dignity are determiners of their own desti-
nies.'5 The American vision of autonomy, derived from philosoph-
("Whatever the contribution of biology to human behavior, it is clear that culture also
contributes a set of guidelines -both explicit and implicit- which are acquired from
infancy onwards, and which tell the individual how to perceive, think, feel and act as
either a 'male' or a 'female' member of that society.").
11. See, e.g., GEORGE HENDERSON & MARTHA PRIMEAUX, TRANSCULTURAL
HEALTH CARE 199-201 (1981) (discussing how poverty restricts patients' capacity for
self-actualization).
12. For a general discussion of the interrelatedness of power and culture, see
ELAINE PINDERHUGHES, UNDERSTANDING RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POWER 109-146
(1989).
13. See, e.g., JACOB LINDENTHAL & MADELEYN SCHNEIDER, HEALTH CONCERNS
OF HISPANICS IN NEW YORK CITY 16-17 (1991) ("Too often, young, inexperienced
children who accompanied their parents have been expected to translate and interpret
medical symptoms ....").
14. The Western moral and political theory of individualism, as exemplified by the
works of Locke and Mill strongly influenced the Western conception of autonomy.
LOCKE, supra note 1, at 17 ("The natural liberty of man is to be free from any supe-
rior power on earth and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to
have only the law of nature for his rule."); MILL, supra note 1, at 54 ("Where not the
person's own character but the traditions or customs of other people are the rule of
conduct, there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness and
quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress."). For a discussion of
American individualism, see Steven Lukes, The Meaning of Individualism, in supra
note 1, at 192-94.
15. See Pellegrino, supra note 6, at 49 ("[Autonomy] implies an obligation to fos-
ter the human capacity for self-determination, to enhance it, and to remove obstacles
to its full operation.").
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ical notions of individualism, honors a form of self-actualization
that is achieved by separating the individual from the community,
the secular from the spiritual, and reason from emotion. 16 Several
other principles, including confidentiality, privacy, and veracity,
may be viewed as derivatives of the principle of autonomy.' 7
In the medical context, the concept of patient autonomy re-
sponded to the 1960's civil rights movements and a social climate
that questioned authority. 18 At the same time, radical advances in
life-sustaining and life-creating medical technology fostered a re-
examination of the patient's role in determining the course of med-
ical treatment.19 These unprecedented social and technological de-
velopments applied uniquely to Western cultures. Born in the
early 1970s, American bioethics was heavily influenced by notions
of liberal individualism as expressed by eighteenth and nineteenth
century Western philosophers and contemporary public discontent
with medical paternalism.2" American bioethicists also equated au-
tonomy with other Western cultural values, such as truth-telling,
self-reliance, and patients' active participation in medical decision-
making and treatment.2' In bioethical theory, personal autonomy
16. The autonomous person, in Western thought, is "consistent, independent, in
command, resistant to control by authorities, and the source of his or her own basic
values, beliefs, and life plans." TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CIILDRESS, PRINCI-
PLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 68 (3d ed. 1989). See also LOCKE, supra note 1, at 35
("The freedom of man, and liberty of acting according to his own will, is grounded on
his having reason."). For a discussion of the predominance of respect for autonomy
as a guiding principle in ethical theory, see ToM BEAUCHAMP & LEROY WALTERS,
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 26-8 (2d ed. 1982).
17. Id. at 28.
18. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 16, at 67-119.
19. Technological innovation includes cardiopulmonary resuscitation, prenatal di-
agnosis, in vitro fertilization, and heart transplants. Arras & Steinbock, supra note 6,
at 3-5. Case law exemplifying re-examination of patients' rights in medical treatment
include Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (allowing an
incompetent patient's family to remove life support where there was clear and con-
vincing evidence of patient's wishes to avoid death-delaying treatment); In the Mat-
ter of Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (allowing valid surrogates to refuse life-saving
measures despite physicians' objections).
20. See Thomas Murray, Communities Need More Than Autonomy, HASTINGS
CENTER REP. (May-June 1994), at 32 ("In the development of bioethics, autonomy
emerged as a powerful protest against evil or thoughtless researchers and paternalistic
physicians. It found deep ideological resonance within American popular, legal, and
political culture: our celebration of the individual, our anger at infringement of
others, our constitutionalized protections of personal liberty, and our faith in markets
as fair and efficient methods for distributing social goods from bathtubs - to babies.").
21. See, e.g., Alan Goldman, The Refutation of Medical Paternalism, in ETHICAL
ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE 58, 58-66 (John D. Arras & Bonnie Steinbock eds., 4th
ed. 1995) (arguing that truth-telling is essential to avoid thwarting the patient's self-
determination); Vicki Michel, Factoring Ethnic and Racial Differences into Bioethics
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emerged as the predominant moral principle guiding medical deci-
sions and treatment.22
B. The Legal Vision of Autonomy - The Search for Patient
Voice
Personal autonomy, as a controlling vision, is firmly established
in the law as a fundamental right, evidenced by the constitutional
right to bodily integrity, liberty, and self-determination. 23 The doc-
trine of consent represents the legal embodiment of these rights for
patients in the medical context.24 As Justice Cardozo wrote in
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospitals,25 "[e]very human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
Decisionmaking, 53 GENERATIONS 23 (1994) ("In the last thirty years, we have
adopted the view that respect for patient autonomy requires that patients be told
everything about their condition and that each patient him- or herself is the only
legitimate decisionmaker about treatment or nontreatment.").
22. BEAUCHAMP & WALTERS, supra note 16, at 27. However, the predominance
of the principle of autonomy has become a subject of heated debate among
bioethicists. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 20, at 33 ("autonomy can only be part of the
story about how we are to live together, how we are to make families and communi-
ties that support the growth of love, enduring loyalties, and compassion."); Arras &
Steinbock, supra note 6, at 25-31 (discussing the numerous challenges to liberal indi-
vidualism and the predominance of autonomy principle by communitarians and femi-
nist ethicists). Some bioethicists have developed models of informed consent and
medical decisionmaking that do not assume patients have a private set of values.
Charles Lidz et al., Two Models of Implementing Informed Consent, 148 ARCHIVES
OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1285 (1988); Ezekiel Emanuel & Linda Emanuel, Four Mod-
els of the Physician-Patient Relationship, 267 JAMA 2221 (1992). But see James F.
Childress & John C. Fletcher, Respect for Autonomy, HASTINGS CENTER REP. (May-
June 1994), at 34 ("Despite a predictable backlash against the principle of respect for
autonomy, it still holds, and should hold, a central place in biomedical ethics in a
liberal society in the 1990s.").
23. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding
a right to abortion based on a constitutional right to bodily integrity); Cruzan v. Di-
rector, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (finding the right to refuse life-
prolonging treatment based on a constitutional right to liberty).
24. The doctrine of informed consent developed from merely a permission to
touch to a tool for facilitating medical decisionmaking. See Mohr v. Williams, 104
N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905). In Mohr, the court found an action for battery in favor of the
plaintiff where a physician obtained his patient's consent to operate on her right ear
and during surgery discovered that the left ear actually needed surgery. The physician
operated on the left ear and, as a result, the patient claimed further impairment to her
left ear. The patient sued the physician for operating on that ear without her consent.
The court extended the concept of consent beyond intentional, unauthorized touching
to include the right of patients to weigh benefits and risks of medical treatment. The
court wrote, "the free citizen's first and greatest right, which underlies all others [is]
... the right to himself." 104 N.W. at 14 (citing Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562 (Ill. 1906)).
25. 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
1328 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
shall be done with his own body .... "26 "Informed consent 27
requires health care providers to disclose diagnoses, the nature and
purpose of a proposed treatment, and the risks of treatment to the
patient.2 8  In addition, it guides medical decisionmaking by defin-
ing the parameters of the patient-physician relationship.29
The law on informed consent represents a struggle to find pa-
tients' voice in medical decisionmaking and to level the playing
field between patients and their physicians. The voice discovered,
however, echoes a notion of autonomy based on Western cultural
values. First, informed consent emphasizes the right of the individ-
ual to make decisions concerning medical treatment.3 ° Second, it
advocates forthrightness regarding medical prognosis, treatment,
and risks. Third, it emphasizes secularism rather than spirituality
by utilizing the scientific method. Fourth, it envisions the active
participation of the individual patient in medical treatment and de-
cisions about treatment.
The doctrine of informed consent, grounded in tort law3' and
applying its theories of battery, negligence, and standards of mea-
26. Id. at 93.
27. The term "informed consent" was coined in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Uni-
versity Board of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
28. 1 FURROW, supra note 3, at 415-17. Some jurisdictions may also require physi-
cians to disclose alternative methods of diagnosis or treatment that are generally ac-
cepted by the medical community. See, e.g., Moore v. Baker, 989 F.2d 1129 (11th Cir.
1993) (requiring disclosure of alternative treatment under Georgia law only where
treatment is generally accepted by reasonably prudent physicians); Gemme v.
Goldberg, 626 A.2d 318 (Conn. Ct. App. 1993) (citing breach of duty by oral surgeon
who failed to disclose alternatives to surgery even where alternative was more dan-
gerous). The California Supreme Court held that a physician has a duty to disclose to
a patient the risks of a failure to decline a test or procedure viewed as valuable by the
physician. Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980). Other cases have considered
the duty to disclose prognosis with treatment. See, e.g., Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598
(Cal. 1993) (finding no breach of duty where the physician failed to disclose statistics
on life expectancy but stating that a jury may decide what is "material information" to
a reasonable patient) (en banc).
29. 1 FURROW, supra note 3, at 409.
30. It is important to distinguish between the medical and legal notions of in-
formed consent. Beauchamp and Childress describe "two senses" of informed con-
sent. The first sense involves autonomous action and understanding by the patient.
The second sense conforms to institutional rules necessary to obtain legally effective
informed consent. The latter has more to do with disclosure and the liability of pro-
fessionals than the autonomous choices of patients. In our litigious society, for many
health care institutions and physicians, informed consent may be driven by fears of
malpractice, not driven by rights-based ideals. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note
16, at 76-8.
31. W.L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 9 (4th ed. 1971).
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suring duty and causation,32 evolved from a right to be free from
nonconsensual interference with one's person to a principle of au-
tonomy, liberty, privacy, and the fulfillment of the physician's
"duty to warn." 33 Early consent cases premised liability on battery
theory,34 requiring that patients demonstrate that they were not in-
formed of the nature of "medical touching. '35 Modem law, how-
ever, treats informed consent as a negligence action; this is a more
nuanced approach that reflects the reality of patient-physician
interactions.36
32. A review of the standard of causation in informed consent can be found in 1
FURROW, supra note 3, at 433-435. The majority of jurisdictions adopt an objective,
reasonable patient test of causality that considers what a reasonable patient would
have done if informed. Id. at 433. Some jurisdictions have considered a subjective
causation test by asking what the particular patient would have done if informed. See,
e.g., Arena v. Gingrich, 748 P.2d 547 (Or. 1988); Spencer v. Seikel, 742 P.2d 1126
(Okla. 1987). In North Carolina, the court in McPherson v. Ellis, 287 S.E.2d 892
(N.C. 1982) endorsed a subjective standard, but was later overturned by the state
informed consent statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13(a) (1993) (requiring an objec-
tive standard for informed consent). Most recently, the Hawaii Supreme Court in
Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 667 (Haw. 1995) overruled Leyson v. Steuermann, 705 P.2d
37 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985) (endorsing a modified objective standard that determines
causation from the viewpoint of the particular patient acting rationally and reason-
ably) and held that causation in an action based on informed consent is to be judged
by an objective standard. 903 P.2d at 676.
33. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECI-
SIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CON-
SENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 18-21 (Oct. 1982).
34. See Mohr, 104 N.W. at 12. The question in a battery action is whether the
physician informed the patient of the nature of the procedure and whether the patient
consented. Proponents of the battery theory argue that its purpose is to protect bod-
ily integrity and thus, it links informed consent to the principle of personal autonomy.
See RUTH FADEN & TOM BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 26-7 (1986). Critics contend that the theory is useful only in situations where
a physician intentionally withholds information or acts beyond the scope of a patient's
consent. Id. at 29-30. In addition, some criticize battery law as providing physicians
with only one defense - that they have obtained consent (or presumed consent in the
case of emergency care). See Jay Katz, Informed Consent - Must It Remain a Fairy
Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 69, 78 (1993). Others maintain that bat-
tery theory disadvantages the patient because many courts are reluctant to view phy-
sicians as acting in bad faith or in an antisocial manner. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra
at 29-30, 127-8. Currently, Pennsylvania is the only state that characterizes the lack of
informed consent as a battery. Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1966), on reh'g,
228 A.2d 735 (Pa. 1967). Most jurisdictions, however, permit a battery approach to
informed consent where consent is found to be absent for a particular procedure. 1
FURROW, supra note 3, at 410.
35. Id. No showing of physical injury is required by battery theory.
36. The negligence theory of liability examines the defendant's unintended harm-
ful act or failure to act. The elements required to establish negligence include a legal
duty, a breach of that duty, measurable injury, a direct causal relation between the
breach of duty and the injury, and a proximate causal relation between the act or
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1. Toward a Patient-Based Standard of Disclosure
To decide a negligence action based on the failure to disclose,
courts must choose a standard of disclosure. The choice of either a
physician or patient-based standard for disclosure directly impacts
the extent to which the laws, and thus physicians, acknowledge pa-
tients' particular values in medical decisionmaking.37 It determines
the connection between the doctrine of informed consent and pa-
tient self-determination by influencing the consideration that
courts give the patient's voice in medical decisionmaking. It can
either frame informed consent as protecting physicians' liability or
as protecting patients' medical choices.38
Most jurisdictions follow the patient-based standard, 39 consider-
ing whether a physician disclosed information that a reasonable pa-
tient would consider material to his or her decision whether or not
to undergo treatment. ° Courts upholding this standard reject the
omission and the injury. As a result, the patient must prove physical injury to win the
case. See FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 1.3,
at 9 (2d ed. 1990) Advocates of negligence theory applaud its ability to allow physi-
cians to invoke many defenses and its acknowledgment that most physicians act in
good faith. 1 FURROW, supra note 3, at 412. Opponents, such as Jay Katz, argue that
negligence theory reduces the doctrine of informed consent to a "failure to warn law,"
based more on professional liability and the expectations of the medical profession
than on patient decisionmaking and self-determination. Jay Katz, Informed Consent:
A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 137, 139 (1977). Other commenta-
tors argue that negligence theory and its emphasis on proving physical harm ignores
the rights-based aspects of the doctrine of informed consent. See Roger Dworkin,
Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy Age, 68 IND. L. J. 727, 729 (1993) (
"The loss of dignity, autonomy, free choice, and bodily integrity that is so exalted in
the rhetoric of informed consent is worth nothing at judgment time."). Still others
suggest that, in the current litigious climate of medical malpractice, cost containment,
and health care reform, informed consent has become a defensive risk management
weapon. Discussion with Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Esq., Director, Division of
Bioethics, Dep't of Epidemiology and Social Science, Montefiore Medical Center,
Bronx, N.Y. (April 1996).
37. 1 FURROW, supra note 3, at 410.
38. For an analysis of informed consent as upholding patient choice and a propo-
sal for reframing the doctrine as a constitutional right to patient choice in medical
decisionmaking, see Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient
Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L. J. 219 (1985).
39. 1 FURROW, supra note 3, at 414-15 n.8 (citing cases adopting objective
standard).
40. Id. at 414. Proponents of the reasonable person standard argue that patient
autonomy interests require an emphasis on the patient rather than the medical profes-
sion. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 16, at 88. Critics argue that the objec-
tive, reasonable person standard "amalgamates patients into one standard of
reasonableness." Dworkin, supra note 36, at 729. See also BEAUCHAMP & CHIL-
DRESS, supra, at 89 ("this reasonable person standard is still plagued by conceptual,
moral, and practical difficulties."). The reasonable person standard in tort law may be
contrasted with that in criminal law. Criminal law endows a reasonable man standard
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approach that requires patients to prove that a reasonable physi-
cian in the same or similar medical community would disclose the
information. Throughout medical history and practice, physicians,
and some lawmakers, believed physicians alone, given their spe-
cialized training and expertise, should make treatment decisions
for their patients.4 ' Indeed, a physician-based negligence standard
holds that the duty to disclose and the scope of disclosure is deter-
mined by the customs of the professional (medical) community. 2
The determination of pertinent information for disclosure is
viewed as a medical question rather than a question of patient
choice. Although approximately twenty-five states, either by case
law4 3 or statute,4 4 adopt the physician-based standard, courts often
experience difficulty applying it because of physicians' reluctance
to testify against one another and the questionable existence of a
community standard in contemporary medical practice. 5
The case law on informed consent illustrates a trend toward an
objective, patient-based standard of disclosure. In 1957, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univer-
with certain of the defendant's physical characteristics in the case of manslaughter, for
example, but disallows peculiar emotional characteristics. The Model Penal Code,
however, allows some subjectivity; defined as the viewpoint of a person in the actor's
situation under the circumstances as he believed them to be. The Code allows consid-
eration of some of the actor's mental or emotional characteristics. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.3(1)(B) (1962). Some areas of criminal procedure, such as the laws of
entrapment, preemptory challenge and public welfare offense, have employed a sub-
jective person standard.
41. See Katz, supra note 34, at 73 ("The idea that patients were also 'autonomous'
human beings, entitled to being partners in decisionmaking, was, until recently, rarely
given recognition in the lexicon of medical ethics.").
42. 1 FURROW, supra note 3, at 413.
43. Id. at 413 n.6 (citing state cases adopting the physician-based standard).
44. Id. at 413 n.7 (citing state statutes adopting physician-based standard).
45. Critics of the physician-based standard ask whether a community standard ex-
ists in modem medical practice, whether physicians can truly know what information
serves the best interest of their patients, and note the potential for abuse in allowing
those judged by a law to set its parameters. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS,
supra note 16, at 87-88. The authors also question whether physicians have sufficient
expertise to determine what information is in their patients' best interest. Id. at 88.
("Medical custom often expresses the presumptions, values, and goals of a medical
orientation, but information provided to patients and subjects needs to be freed from
the entrenched values and goals of medical professionals."); Dworkin, supra note 36,
at 729 (arguing that the professional standard "is directed exclusively to the collective
preferences of professionals"). Proponents argue that the professional standard up-
holds physicians' professional duty to seek their patients' best interests, recognizes
physicians' limited time to discuss all possible risks with their patients, and acknowl-
edges physicians' ability to evaluate the impact that risks may have on particular pa-
tients. 1 FURROW, supra note 3, at 413.
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sity Board of Trustees 6 that physicians had a duty to disclose the
risks and alternatives of treatment. This decision simultaneously
affirmed patients' right to self-determination in the medical context
and physicians' important role in facilitating medical decisions. 7
TWelve years later, in the landmark case Canterbury v. Spence,48
the D.C. circuit emphasized patient self-determination and held
that a "patient's right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the
duty to reveal. '49 Canterbury paved the way for a recognition of
patients' rights in medical decisionmaking and a richer doctrine of
informed consent." Thereafter, courts began to question the effi-
cacy of the professional practice standard and to insist on more
meaningful informed consent in medical treatment. Most signifi-
cantly, Canterbury established a patient-oriented disclosure stan-
dard by making the reasonable patient, in what the physician
knows or should know to be in the patient's position, 1 the measure
of the scope of disclosure.5 2 The court rejected prior courts' reli-
ance on the professional practice standard; instead, the court deter-
mined that "it is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician,
to determine for himself the direction in which his interests lie."'53
The court argued that physicians should communicate to the pa-
tient "the inherent and potential hazards of the proposed treat-
ment, the alternatives to that treatment, if any, and the results
46. 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. 1957). Salgo involved a medical malpractice action where a
patient sued his physicians for negligent performance and for failing to warn him of
the risk of paralysis. The court held that the physician violated his duty to the patient
by withholding facts "necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the
patient to the proposed treatment." Id. at 181.
47. Some commentators identify Salgo as representing the judicial ambivalence
that has remained at the heart of the doctrine of informed consent, whether informed
consent is "about the extent to which individual and societal well-being is better
served by encouraging patients' self-determination or supporting physicians' paternal-
ism."). FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 34, at 126-27 (quoting Jay Katz). See also
JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 61 (1984) ("Going in two
opposite directions - discretion and full disclosure - his [Justice Bray's] answer went
nowhe re.").
48. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). That same year,
California and Rhode Island shifted from a physician-based standard to a reasonable,
objective patient-based standard. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); Wilkin-
son v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972).
49. 464 F.2d at 786.
50. Id. at 781-82.
51. Id. at 791.
52. Id. 783-84.
53. Id. at 781. It adopted Schloendorff's language regarding the patient's right "to
determine what shall be done with his own body" and decided that patients' best
interests are served when they are informed of information material to their medical
decision. Id. at 780 (quoting Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 129, 105 N.E. at 93).
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likely if the patient remains untreated."54 The decision criticized
the physician-based standard, arguing that it required physicians to
guess what information their patients would deem material. None-
theless, the Canterbury court chose an objective, rather than a sub-
jective, patient-based standard, reacting to fears of patients'
hindsight declarations of what they would have decided had the
physician disclosed the risks.
The 1990 decision in Moore v. Regents of University of Califor-
nia,56 clarified the scope of informed consent by requiring physi-
cians to provide clear and precise information regarding their
personal interests in the patient that are unrelated to medical treat-
ment options, but which might affect patients' medical judgment.57
The Moore court based its decision on three principles: the pa-
tient's right to autonomy, the doctrine of informed consent, and
the physician's duty to disclose all information that is material to
the patient's interest. 58 Moore marked the first time a court ex-
tended the physician's duty to disclose to include informing pa-
tients about factors beyond the medical procedure at hand. As a
result, it lends support to a proposition that patients may desire an
array of information when considering medical treatment.5 9
54. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787-88.
55. In Cobbs v. Grant, the California Supreme Court wrote, "[W]e doubt that
justice will be served by placing the physician in jeopardy of the patient's bitterness
and disillusionment. Thus an objective test is preferable: i.e., what would a prudent
person in the patient's position have decided if adequately informed of all significant
perils." 502 P.2d at 11-12. Commentators note the irony of choosing an objective
standard for a doctrine developed to promote individual decisionmaking. See, e.g., 1
FURROW, supra note 3, at 414; Ben A. Rich, Postmodern Medicine: Deconstructing
The Hippocratic Oath, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 77, 98 (1993) ("There is, of course, an
exquisite irony in the fact that informed consent, a medico-legal doctrine intended to
recognize and facilitate patient autonomy through full disclosure of all pertinent in-
formation, should be measured by either an objective or professional standard.").
56. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991).
57. Examples of unrelated interests include the physician's potential role as re-
searcher, investor or profiteer. In Moore, the economic interests in question were
profits produced from the nonconsensual patenting of a cell line derived from the
patient's excised spleen and other bodily fluids. The court held that "the existence of
a motivation for a medical procedure unrelated to the patient's health is a potential
conflict of interest and a fact material to the patient's decision." Id. at 486.
58. Id. at 485.
59. Perhaps a more accurate interpretation of the Moore decision focuses on the
majority's vision of informed consent as a tool to monitor the medical marketplace
and the commercial relationships that may arise between physicians and their pa-
tients. Discussion with Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Esq., Director, Division of Bioethics,
Dep't of Epidemiology and Social Science, Monteflore Medical Center, Bronx, N.Y.
(March 1996).
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Most recently, in Arato v. Avedon, 60 the California Supreme
Court affirmed that the lack of informed consent can constitute a
negligence cause of action and upheld the reasonable patient stan-
dard of disclosure. The court, however, explicitly acknowledged
that patients' need for medical information may vary and that phy-
sicians should not be required to disclose particular species of in-
formation regardless of the circumstances.61 In addition, the court
noted that some patients may not benefit from full disclosure of
information by stating that "'each patient presents a separate prob-
lem, that the patient's mental and emotional condition is important
and in certain cases may be crucial .... ", Given the California
court's influence on the evolution of the doctrine of informed con-
sent,63 the Arato decision is likely to affect the doctrine in other
jurisdictions. The court found that physicians had not breached
their duty to obtain informed consent by failing to disclose statisti-
cal information about mortality rates from radiation and chemo-
therapy treatment.' 4 It held that a physician should disclose "all
material information . . . which the physician knows or should
know would be regarded as significant by a reasonable person in
the patient's position .... 65 In the end, the court entrusted the
60. 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993).
61. Id. at 606 ("the contexts and clinical settings in which physician and patient
interact and exchange information material to therapeutic decisions are so multifari-
ous, the informational needs and degree of dependency of individual patients so vari-
ous, and the professional relationship itself such an intimate and irreducibly
judgment-laden one .... ").
62. Id. (quoting Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181).
63. See Moore, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); Truman, 611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980); Cobbs,
502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972). The lower court decision in Salgo, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App.
1957), was also influential and significant.
64. In Arato, the plaintiff consented to and underwent radiation and chemother-
apy treatment for approximately one year for pancreatic malignancy. During his ini-
tial visit with the oncologists, he completed a new patient questionnaire which asked
whether he desired "to be told the truth about [his] condition" or whether he wished
the physician to "bear the burden for him." 858 P.2d at 600. The plaintiff indicated
that he wished to be told the truth. The oncologists discussed the associated risks of
the treatment, disclosed that most victims die from pancreatic cancer, and that despite
the proposed treatment, the patient was at serious risk of an incurable reoccurrence.
Id. at 601. The plaintiff died after one year of treatment. His family alleged that by
failing to disclose statistics about his life expectancy, his physicians failed to obtain his
informed consent. Id. at 602. The family argued that these figures were "material" to
the patient's decision to choose treatment. Id. They stated that had he been aware of
the bleak data, he would have foregone treatment and spent his remaining time with
his family and business affairs. Id. Instead, the patient chose the treatment and died
without settling his personal matters which allegedly caused the failure of his con-
tracting business and substantial tax losses.
65. Id. at 607.
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jury and the physician, rather than the particular patient, with the
responsibility for deciding what constitutes material information.
Justice Armand Arabian, author of the Arato opinion, exemplified
the court's ambivalence regarding the standard for disclosure by
later writing that the level of disclosure should be "relegate[d] to
the venerable American jury, which presumably is also composed
of typical patients" and that "any practical guidance must come
from the medical profession. ' 66 Despite its affirmation of the ob-
jective, and to some extent, the physician-based standard, Arato
supports the notion that some patients may wish not to receive in-
formation about likely consequences of medical treatment, and
leaves the door open for courts to consider quality of life issues in
the context of assessing appropriate informed consent standards.
2. Respecting Patients' Values in Medical Decisionmaking
The modem shift toward a reasonable patient standard of disclo-
sure reflects the courts' growing respect for patient rights and voice
in medical decisionmaking. In contrast to a subjective standard
that requires physicians to disclose information relevant to a partic-
ular patient and that judges whether a particular patient would
have reached the same, specific decision, the reasonable patient
standard advocates a monolithic67 and noncontextua 68 vision of in-
66. Hon. Armand Arabian, Informed Consent: From The Ambivalence of Arato to
the Thunder of Thor, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 261 (1994) (analyzing Arato opinion and
the proper level of disclosure). Professor Judith Daar argues that Arato promotes a
physician-patient relationship whereby the physician views the patient as patient, and
no more. Judith Daar, Informed Consent. Defining Limits Through Therapeutic Pa-
rameters, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 187, 195 (1995) ("The physician need not be con-
cerned about the patient as investor, business manager, a father or a spouse.").
Another commentator, Alexander Morgan Capron observes that the Arato opinion
"directs physicians to focus on patients' bodies rather than their lives." Alexander
Morgan Capron, Duty, Truth, and Whole Human Beings, HASTINGS CENTER REP., 13
(July-Aug. 1993). He further suggests that Arato leaves the door open for future
courts to consider the whole patient - not just the patient's decisionmaking needs. Id.
at 14.
67. The American law of informed consent generally assumes that all patients
share a desire for the same amount and type of information from their physicians and
that medical decisions are made in similar medical settings. Exceptions to these pre-
sumptions in the case law include courts' consideration of exceptions to the require-
ment of disclosure, including emergencies, patient waivers, and therapeutic privilege.
See 1 FURROW, supra note 3, at 435-39.
68. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L. J. 899, 906 (1994)
("Contextualization would advance the aim of cost-effectiveness and would also be
desirable in its own right... by tailoring the law's requirements more carefully to the
different settings in which risks arise and are discussed, assessed, and acted upon.").
Schuck argues for a movement away from a unitary informed doctrine toward one
"with different requirements for different treatments and choice contexts." Id. at 954.
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formed consent.69 It defines "reasonable person" as a person
holding Western values and favoring Western approaches to medi-
cal decisionmaking. Although courts have not adopted the pure
subjective standard,70 recent case law and statutes acknowledge
that different patients may approach medical decisionmaking in
different ways. In addition to the Moore and Arato courts' reflec-
tion on the values held by particular patients, some courts hold that
a patient may testify as to what she or he would have done if fully
informed.71 In Fain v. Smith,72 the Alabama Supreme Court
adopted a modified objective standard that considered the needs
of "a reasonable person with all the characteristics of plaintiff, in-
cluding idiosyncrasies and religious beliefs. 73
Recent cases concerning the right to die and the right to refuse
or demand medical treatment also exemplify courts' increasing
willingness to respect patients' right to make decisions consistent
with their own values. In Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health,74 the Supreme Court allowed an incompetent patient's
family to remove life support where there was clear and convincing
evidence regarding the patient's wishes regarding death-delaying
treatment. The decision expanded the notion of informed consent
to include the right not to consent, or to refuse treatment.75
69. Some commentators also suggest that the objective standard fails to honor the
underlying values of informed consent by limiting individual self-determination. See,
e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 16, at 90-1 ("Despite many problems that
plague the subjective standard of law, it is a preferable moral standard of disclosure
from the standpoint of the principle of respect for autonomy, because it acknowledges
the independent informational needs and desires of persons in the process of making
difficult decisions."); Dworkin, supra note 36, at 729 ("Honoring autonomy would
require the adoption of a subjective standard of disclosure that recognized the pa-
tient's right to be unreasonable.").
70. Due to fears that the patient, with hindsight, will decide that the information
not disclosed was material to his or her decision and that she or he would have de-
clined treatment. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790-91 (D.C. Cir.) ("It
places the physician in jeopardy of the patient's hindsight and bitterness."), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
71. 1 FURROW, supra note 3, at 415. See e.g., Bourgeois v. McDonald, 622 So.2d
684 (La. Ct. App.) (allowing patient testimony as an inextricable part of informed
consent issues), writ denied, 629 So.2d 1177 (La. 1993). Although a subjective stan-
dard for disclosure has not been adopted by any state, some jurisdictions have
adopted a subjective causation standard. Other jurisdictions have offered "subjec-
tive" variations on objective measure of proximate cause. Recently, however, a Ha-
waii Supreme court overruled a "modified objective standard" in favor of an objective
reasonable patient test. See Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 667 (Haw. 1995).
72. 479 So.2d 1150 (Ala. 1985).
73. Id. at 1155.
74. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
75. Id. at 270.
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Cruzan also solidified the holding in Matter of Quinlan76 which ex-
tended self-determination to include allowing valid surrogates to
refuse life-saving measures.77 In subsequent cases, courts have per-
mitted patient representatives to facilitate incompetent patients'
desire for death-delaying treatment that physicians deemed futile
and inappropriate.78 Courts have even begun to consider patients'
decisions to hasten death where the medical condition is terminal.79
These decisions not only affirm the value of patient voice in medi-
cal decisionmaking, but they support decisionmaking approaches
that include family and community members.
Congress expressly legislated patients' right to express their indi-
vidualized values in medical decisionmaking. In 1990, the Patient
Self-Determination Act80 (the "PSDA") became law as part of the
federal Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.81 Congress
enacted the PSDA in response to the right to die movement,82 al-
lowing patients to exercise their desire not to receive life-prolong-
ing or futile treatment. The Act reinforced Do Not Resuscitate
statutes by requiring health care providers to provide patients with
information about advanced directives, hospital protocols, and
state law regarding the right to refuse treatment.8 3 The law re-
76. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.) (allowing a patient to discontinue death-delaying medical
treatment based on the patient's right to privacy and self-determination), cert. denied
sub nom Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
77. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284.
78. See, e.g., In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994)
(requiring a hospital to provide life-sustaining treatment to anencephalic infant at
parents' request); In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Hennepin County, Minn., P. Ct.
June 28, 1991), reprinted in 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 369 (1991) (allowing incompetent
patient's representative, her husband, to demand futile death-delaying treatment for
patient). Cruzan, however, clearly requires that surrogates demonstrate "clear and
convincing evidence" of the patient's wishes to refuse treatment. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
284.
79. See Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996)
(declaring that Washington's ban on physician-assisted suicide is unconstitutional be-
cause it violated due process clause as applied to terminally ill patients who wished to
hasten their own deaths), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. July 3, 1996)
(No. 96-110); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3795 (U.S. May 16, 1996) (No. 95-1858) (finding no fundamental right to
assisted suicide but holding that laws prohibiting assisted suicide violated Equal Pro-
tection Clause).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (1994).
81. Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§4206, 4751, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
82. For discussion of the right-to-die movement, see HARRY R. GLICK, THE
RIGwr To DIE, POLICY INNOVATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 53-132 (1992). For a
discussion of DNR/advanced directives, see BARRY R. FURROW ET. AL., BIOETHICS:
HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 216-18, 263-79 (1991).
83. 2 FURROW, supra note 3, at 443. Compliance is required by all health care
institutions and long-term care facilities participating in Medicare and Medicaid pro-
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quires that those covered by the Act provide every patient with
written information describing his or her rights under state law to
make decisions concerning medical care, including the right to ac-
cept or refuse medical treatment and the right to devise advanced
directives. 84 In addition, covered providers must provide written
documentation delineating the provider's specific policies regard-
ing these rights .8  As a result, all American health care institutions
must have formal policies that consider patients' involvement and
rights in medical decisionmaking. 86 Moreover, the PSDA necessi-
tates provider-patient communication about particular patients'
wishes on life-sustaining treatment by requiring that physicians
document whether that patient has signed any advanced
directive.87
3. The Exceptions to Informed Consent
The law also recognizes several exceptions to informed consent.
As acknowledged in Canterbury8 8 and Cobbs v. Grant9 and later
affirmed in Arato,90 patients may neither benefit from nor desire to
receive certain medical information. The right to forgo Western-
defined approaches to medical decisionmaking is found in three
exceptions to the doctrine of informed consent: emergency, thera-
peutic privilege, and waiver. In the emergency case, where the pa-
tient is unconscious and prompt treatment is required, courts agree
that physicians can dispense with informed consent as long as the
physician acts according to customary "emergency practice."91
Some courts hold that consent is implied in emergency situations.92
grams. The Secretary of Health and Human Services is required to cut all Medicaid
and Medicare funding to non-compliant institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(b) (1994).
The statute applies to patients upon admission to hospitals and nursing facilities, prior
to receipt of care by home health care agencies and hospice programs and at the time
of membership in a health maintenance organization. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(f)(1)(A),
1396a(w)(1)(A) (1994).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (f) (1994).
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(f)(1)(A), 1396a(w)(1)(A) (1994).
86. See generally Richard A. Shugrue, The Patient Self-Determination Act, 26
CREIGHTON L. REV. 751 (1993) (examples of policies developed by providers).
87. In recent years, many commentators have critiqued the effectiveness of the
Patient Self-Determination Act on promoting patient autonomy and completion of
patient advanced directives. See, e.g., Mathy Mezey, Making the PSDA Work For the
Elderly, 18 GENERATIONS 13 (1994). The limitations of the PSDA and advanced di-
rectives are discussed in Part III of this Note.
88. 464 F.2d at 786-89.
89. 502 P.2d 1, 1 (Cal. 1972).
90. 858 P.2d at 609. See generally 1 FURROW, supra note 3, at 436-37.
91. 1 FURROW, supra note 3, at 435.
92. Id.
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The exception of therapeutic privilege allows physicians to with-
hold information from a patient when disclosure may cause the pa-
tient emotional or physical harm.93 Although courts rarely invoke
the privilege to dismiss a case, many state statutes incorporate the
privilege to protect patients from themselves. 94 Canterbury upheld
a "therapeutic exception" that enabled physicians to validly over-
ride the disclosure requirement where such disclosure posed a
threat to the patient's "well-being" or in the case of an emer-
gency. 95 Paradoxically, this exception undermined the patient-
based standard by allowing physicians to employ their professional
discretion to withhold information from their patients. It sug-
gested, however, the court's understanding that patients may have
varied needs for medical information and supported a movement
toward a more comprehensive informed consent.96
93. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789. In addition, the Salgo court established the de-
fense of "therapeutic privilege," whereby full disclosure may be tempered by physi-
cian discretion. 317 P.2d at 181. The court's discussion did not, however, provide
physicians with guidelines regarding physician discretion nor did it detail its legal ba-
sis for the doctrine of informed consent. It also failed to explicitly ground informed
consent in battery or negligence theory.
94. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.-55.556 (b)(4) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 6852 (b)(3) (1989); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805 (d)(4) (McKinney 1993); OR.
REV. STAT. § 677.097 (2) (1989); TEX. REV. ANN. CIV. STAT. art. 71, § 6.07 (a)(2)
(West Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909(d) (Supp. 1995).
95. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788-89 (citing other defenses to allegations of failure
to disclose such as patient's prior knowledge of the information not disclosed and the
immateriality of nondisclosed information).
96. Following Canterbury, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d
1 (Cal. 1972) and Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972) affirmed an objective,
patient-based standard for disclosure and causation. Cobbs also affirmed the defenses
for non-disclosure including emergency, incompetence, therapeutic privilege, patient
waiver, or dangers remote and commonly known to be remote. 502 P.2d at 10. Simi-
larly, Wilkinson recognized the defenses of emergency and therapeutic privilege. 295
A.2d at 686, 689. In a more recent case, Wheeldon v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367 (S.D.
1985), the South Dakota Supreme Court proposed that the physician-based standard
could conflict with patient needs. ("We agree that the right to know - to be informed-
is a fundamental right personal to the patient and should not be subject to restriction
by medical practices that may be at odds with the patient's informational needs."). Id.
at 374. In Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980), the California Supreme Court
relied on Canterbury and expanded the duty of physician disclosure to include the
material risks of not consenting to recommended treatment. The case involved an
action brought by the children of a woman who died from cervical cancer. They al-
leged that the physician failed to disclose the risks of not allowing a Pap Smear test,
which the patient repeatedly refused. The physician, and the court minority, argued
that the duty to disclose applies only to treatments to which patients consent. One
commentator writes that this right to an informed refusal requires a physician to take
time to maximize the patient's choices. 1 FURROW, supra note 3, at 425. Most re-
cently, courts have considered the relevance of nonmedical interests for informed
consent. See Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal.
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The third exception of patient waiver allows patients to forgo
their right to receive medical information. Waiver provisions have
been adopted either by statute 97 or by judicial ruling.98 The U.S.
Supreme Court defines waiver as the voluntary and intentional re-
linquishment of a known right.99 A definition of waiver in the con-
text of informed consent may be analogized to other areas of law
where waiver of individual rights has been an issue.' In medicine,
the notion of waiver acknowledges that some patients prefer to
trust their physicians' professional judgment and that others may
lack confidence in the ability to analyze risk information. 1 1 The
law allows patients to waive their right to give an informed con-
sent, as long as it is made with full information and without coer-
cion"' and, in the case of research and experimental treatment,
where there exists "no more than a minimal risk to the patients.' 10 3
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991) (imposing an obligation on physicians to dis-
close their research and economic interests); Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598 (Cal.
1993) (considering and rejecting obligating physicians to disclose statistical mortality
rates of particular procedure).
97. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.-55.556 (b)(2) (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-114-206 (b)(2)(c) (Michie 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6852 (b)(2) (Supp.
1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C(2)(II)(b)(3) (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
14-5(2)(c) (Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909(c)(2) (Supp. 1995).
98. Arato, 858 P.2d at 609 (acknowledging that a "patient may validly waive the
right to be informed"); Holt v. Nelson, 523 P.2d 211, 219 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) ("A
physician need not disclose the hazards of treatment when the patient has requested
she not be told about the dangers. .. ."); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal. 1972)
("[A] medical doctor need not make disclosure of risks when the patient requests that
he not be so informed."); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(determining that physicians should not be held liable for failure to disclose resulting
from a patient's specific request not to be informed).
99. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938).
100. See Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking
a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REV.
413.
101. See id. at 459; Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Laswell: Some Reflections on
Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J.
683, 694 (1975).
102. 1 FURROW, supra note 3, at 437.
103. This refers to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) stan-
dards for permitting a waiver of informed consent in research. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116
(d)(1) (1995). The Federal Drug Administration standards are more detailed, con-
taining four criteria that are necessary to invoke an exception to informed consent. 21
C.F.R. § 50.23 (a)(1)-(4) (1996).
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H. Culture and the Limits of the Western Definition
of Autonomy
Case One
M.Y., a fifty-nine year old Korean woman, was admitted to the
hospital for exploratory surgery following an exam by her doctor
indicating a growth on M.Y.'s neck. M.Y. did not question her
general physician, her primary provider since she immigrated to
the United States ten years ago, about her condition or the proce-
dure. Once admitted, M.Y.'s two grown sons, her daughter, and
her brother-in-law visited daily. Each time the surgeon entered the
room to discuss the surgery with M.Y., her family ushered him
quickly from the room and questioned him about the procedure
and its risks. When the surgeon stated that he could not disclose
this information without M.Y.'s permission or presence, the family
asked him to shield M.Y. from any "bad news" and for him to tell
M.Y. that she would soon be discharged. When the surgeon finally
approached M.Y. alone, after visiting hours, she reluctantly made
eye contact and requested that he discuss her case with her primary
physician and family. She refused to sign the informed consent
documents without the presence of her sons and brother-in-law.10 4
Case Two
E.R., a thirty-four year old Puerto Rican man living with AIDS
arrived for his clinic appointment accompanied by his sixty-five
year old mother and twenty year old sister. He informed the clinic
staff that he had not renewed his medications, because his mother
and sister believed they were harmful. E.R. and his mother an-
nounced that they had consulted a well-respected community
healer. The clinic staff explained the life-threatening risks of refus-
ing the prescribed medication and expressed their doubts about the
healer's credentials and expertise. E.R. and his family adamantly
refused the staff's recommended treatment and continued to follow
the healer's instructions for care. In addition, E.R. requested that
his physicians confer with the healer in determining his medical
treatment. He informed the clinic social worker and physician that
he would abide by the healer's assessment of the physicians' rec-
ommendations. The clinic physician threatened to request a psy-
104. Based on interview with Dr. Michael Lee, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.,
January 1996.
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chological consultation to determine E.R.'s competency for
medical decisionmaking. 10 5
The preceding case examples illustrate the tensions that arise
when physicians attempt to "fit" patients into a noncontextual
model of medical care and decisionmaking and care. The cases
also demonstrate how well-meaning efforts to enforce the doctrine
of informed consent risk depriving patients of their autonomy by
denying his or her particular cultural values. M.Y. may be pre-
cluded from choosing to have her family closely involved in her
medical care and E.R. may be prevented from refusing unwanted
medical treatment. In the case of M.Y., the physician denied the
patient the right to waive her right to decide and hear information.
In the case of E.R., the clinic staff denied the patient the right to
delegate decisionmaking authority to a culturally-respected practi-
tioner or to waive his right to decide. In both cases, the health care
providers risk jeopardizing their relationships with their patients.
In the end, the Western ideal of informed consent neither pro-
motes self-determination nor promotes the patient-physician
relationship.
M.Y. and E.R.'s stories are not uncommon scenarios in the med-
ical clinic or in the private physician's office. Studies demonstrate
that ethnicity is a significant factor related to attitudes toward med-
ical decisionmaking. 10 6  Most importantly, American health care
providers practice, and American patients reside, in a nation rich in
cultural diversity. More than nine million legal immigrants are ex-
pected to enter the United States during this decade. 10 7  This
marks the largest wave of immigration since the first decade of the
twentieth century.10 8 Between 1990 and 1995, more than four mil-
lion immigrants entered American society. 10 9 A large percentage
of these individuals come from developing countries and the non-
Western world. Instead of assimilating into a great "melting pot,"
105. Based on the author's experience as a therapist in an outpatient AIDS clinic at
Bronx Municipal Hospital, Bronx, N.Y., during June 1991-May 1993.
106. Blackhall, supra note 6 (assessing attitudes toward disclosure and prognosis of
two hundred subjects from four ethnic groups); Joseph Caresse & Lorna Rhodes,
Western Bioethics on the Navajo Reservation, 274 JAMA 826 (1995) (assessing the
tensions between the belief system in traditional Navajo culture and the requirements
of the informed consent law by interviewing thirty-four Navajo patients and health
care providers on a Navajo Indian reservation in northeast Arizona).
107. Mary Sit, Coming To America as Asians and Latinos Lead The Latest Wave,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 25, 1995, at A2.
108. Id.




many sub-cultures seek and celebrate their ethnic heritage. Not all
people living in the United States share Western values,"10 as ex-
pressed in American laws, concerning medical decisionmaking.
This section analyzes the tensions raised by the case examples and
illustrates that the elements of Western-defined autonomy - indi-
vidualism, activism, rationalism, and veracity - sometimes conflict
with beliefs traditionally found in African, Asian, Hispanic, and
Native American cultures."'
A. Active Participation in Medical Care
Western culture's bias toward individualism implies a preference
for active participation in medical decisionmaking. The Western
patient may favor controlling all or most aspects of his or her medi-
cal care, aggressively pursuing or challenging their health care
providers, and actively treating illness or delaying death. Non-
Western cultures, however, may feel more comfortable deferring to
a physician's authority, favor less assertive interactions with their
physicians, and accept illness and death as an inevitable part of life.
Japanese physicians are traditionally paternalistic and authorita-
tive toward patients and their families, reflecting social values that
emphasize law, order, and authority. 112 Doctors expect patients
and their families to behave in a modest, non-assertive manner."13
The Japanese norm of enryo governs much of the behavior in inter-
personal relationships." 4 Enryo consists of a collection of behav-
ior that calls for restraint, reserve, and lack of assertiveness in
social interactions. This norm reflects a more general Asian cul-
tural characteristic of inconspicuousness as a means of insuring
110. Robin M. Williams, a noted sociologist, identified fifteen cultural themes that
generally reflect the Anglo-Saxon influence on American culture including efficiency,
practicality, equality, individual freedom, secular rationality, and independence.
ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 452-
502 (3d ed. 1970).
111. See supra note 5 (recognizing dangers of generalizing about cultures).
112. See Rihito Kimura, Conflict and Harmony in Japanese Medicine: A Challenge
to Traditional Culture in Neonatal Care, in TRANSCULTURAL DIMENSIONS IN MEDI-
CAL ETHICS 145, 151 (Edmund Pellegrino et al. eds., 1992). See also Hiroyuki Hattori
et al., The Patient's Right to Information in Japan - Legal Rules and Doctors' Opin-
ions, 32 Soc. SCI. MED. 1007, 1007 (1991) ("In Japan, however, the concept of in-
formed consent has not yet been generally accepted by the medical profession. The
right of the patient to take part in the decision-making process to a large extent re-
mains ignored.").
113. This is particularly true with professionals such as physicians, government offi-
cials, and employers. Kimura, supra note 112, at 146.
114. HENDERSON & PRIMEAUX, supra note 11, at 264.
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harmonious relations and respect for those in authority. 115  Tradi-
tional Chinese and Taiwanese patients may also demonstrate an
unquestioning respect for and deference to authority. 16
B. Individualism and Self-Reliance
The Western, and particularly the American, vision of patient
autonomy favors individualism. 117 Individualism conceives of per-
sons as independent, self-reliant and self-respecting."18 It protects
the rights of the individual over the group." 9 For many cultures,
however, the perception of self and the individual is defined by
relationships with others. 20  Patient autonomy is perceived and
achieved by family or community consensus and centralized deci-
sionmaking. 121 Many cultures value the harmonious functioning of
the family more than individual decisionmaking 22 Some cultures
are more comfortable with deferring to the authority of their physi-
cians. Others may value self-reliance, but equate the concept of
"self" with that of "community.' 123
Although Asian cultures 124 are highly diverse, they generally fol-
low a family-centered model of medical decisionmaking, defer to
medical authority, and value harmony. In Japan, the group is gen-
erally viewed as more important than the individual and is inti-
mately involved with an individual's sense of self.' 25 For traditional
115. Inconspicuousness is defined as the avoidance of attracting special attention to
oneself. Id. at 273.
116. Id. at 75.
117. See supra notes 3-4 (discussing individualistic strains in the Western notion of
autonomy).
118. See WILLIAMS, supra note 110, at 495.
119. See, e.g., Arras & Steinbock, supra note 6, at 26 (individual as the unique focal
point of moral concern); Mark Salgo, Two Cheers For Community, HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 33, 33 (May-June 1994) (noting the individualistic instinct of liberalism).
120. See Blackhall, supra note 6, at 824 (finding that Korean-American and Mexi-
can-American patients favor family decisionmaking models).
121. The Blackhall study defined this model as "the sole responsibility of the family
to hear bad news about the patient's diagnosis and prognosis and to make the difficult
decisions about life support." Id. at 824.
122. See, e.g., HENDERSON & PRIMEAUX, supra note 11, at 264-65 (describing the
emphasis on harmony and avoidance of conflict by Asian cultures).
123. Robert F. Murray, Jr., Minority Perspectives on Biomedical Ethics, in TRANS-
CULTURAL DIMENSIONS IN MEDICAL ETHICS 35, 40 (Edmund Pellegrino et al. eds.,
1992).
124. Members of the Asian American community have their origins in China, Ha-
waii, the Philippines, Korea, and Japan. SPECrOR, supra note 5, at 178.
125. HELMAN, supra note 5, at 17 (citing T. Tamura and A. Lau, Connectedness
Versus Separateness: Application of Family Therapy to Chinese Families, 31 FAM.
PROC. 319, 319-40 (1992)).
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Chinese, Filipinos, and Japanese, medical decisions include not
only the patient's interest, but also the interest of his or her whole
family. 126 Some Chinese patients may refuse medical information
and request that the physician confer only with the patient's spouse
or children. 127  Many Chinese also place high value on the individ-
ual in relationship to others and to the environment. 128 Chinese
Marxists define the essence of a human being as the "sum of social
relations."' 29 Confucianists 30 and traditional Chinese view the
universe as an indivisible entity where each person is linked to one
another in harmonious balance. 13  Japanese Buddhist principles in
bioethical decisionmaking focus on kyokan (feeling of together-
ness) and ningen (human person in relational context). 32  In addi-
tion, respect for, and deference to, physicians by Japanese is strong,
and patients often trust their physicians with total and final deci-
sionmaking authority. 133 Koreans may view the Western model of
patient autonomy not as empowering, but as "isolating and bur-
densome to patients who are too sick and ignorant about their con-
dition to be able to make meaningful choices.' 34 As a result, these
patients preferred a more family-centered model of
decisionmaking. 135
In one study, Mexican-Americans also favored family-centered
decisionmaking and were less likely to believe that the patient
should be truthfully informed about diagnosis and prognosis. 136
Mexican culture emphasizes the needs of the collective: La
familia.37 As a result, many traditional Mexicans view illness as a
126. Ren-Zong Qui, Medical Ethics and Chinese Culture, in TRANSCULTURAL
DIMENSIONS IN MEDICAL ETHICS 155, 167 (Edmund Pellegrino et al. eds., 1992). See
also Doris Wilkinson, Family Ethnicity in America, in FAMILY ETHNICITY 15, 39 (Har-
riette Pipes McAdoo ed., 1993).
127. Qui, supra note 126, at 167.
128. One commentator goes so far as to suggest that "rights-oriented individualism
is essentially alien to the Chinese." Id. at 172.
129. Id. at 171. At the same time, the Chinese are "spiritually individualistic in the
sense that they always pay a considerable amount of attention to self-development
and self-perfection." Id.
130. Confucianists believe that what distinguishes humans from animals is their hu-
maneness (ren) or capacity for loving others. Id. at 172.
131. SPECTOR, supra note 5, at 243.
132. Kimura, supra note 112, at 151.
133. See Hattori, supra note 112, at 1007.
134. Blackhall, supra note 6, at 824.
135. Id.
136. Id at 823-24.
137. Wilkinson, supra note 126, at 34-35 (citing numerous studies holding the para-
mount importance of family interactions among Mexican-Americans).
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"family affair.' 1 38 The centrality of family in daily living and deci-
sionmaking is also found among Puerto Ricans and Mexican-
Americans. 139
A long history of slavery and racism has led American Blacks
140
to forge connections to their African cultural traditions, which em-
phasize family and community relations.141 Native Americans ' 142
emphasis on family includes residential proximity, mutual aid, and
involvement in daily life activities. 143 Like many Indians, the Indi-
ans of the Southwest are family and tribal oriented, rather than
individualistic.'" A sense of trust and connection to the tribe often
connects a Native American's medical decision to tribal values and
relationships. 145
138. La familia is a broad concept that may include single households, combina-
tions, and/or all extended relatives. Wilkinson, supra note 126, at 37. It may include
not only blood relatives, but also special friends. Id. at 160. See also VERN L. BUL-
LOUGH & BONNIE BULLOUGH, HEALTH CARE FOR THE OTHER AMERICANS 79-80
(1982) (discussing Mexican culture and hospitalization); LINDENTHAL & SCHNEIDER,
supra note 13, at 10 (describing Mexican culture's notion of La familia).
139. See BULLOUGH & BULLOUGH, supra note 138, at 81 (noting the extended fam-
ily pattern in both Mexico and Puerto Rico); Wilkinson, supra note 126, at 37; Cathe-
rine Street Chilman, Hispanic Families in the United States, in FAMILY ETHNICITY 141,
150-55 (Harriette Pipes McAdoo ed., 1993).
140. Black Americans may have origins in Africa, the West Indian islands, the Do-
minican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica. SPECTOR, supra note 5, at 191.
141. In her article examining coping strategies of African-Americans, Alfrieda
Daly notes the importance of family and the notion of community as extended family
in providing care for individuals in need. Alfrieda Daly et al., Effective Coping Strate-
gies of African Americans, 40 SOCIAL WORK 240 (1992). She cites numerous scholars
who evaluate the impact of slavery and racism on African-American family systems
and affirm the persistence of family and community networks in African-American
culture. Id. at 241-42. See also LOCKE, supra note 5, at 24-25 (noting scholars who
suggest that the family is one of the strongest and most important traditions in the
African-American community). In his essay on African-American perspectives on
biomedical ethics, Robert F. Murray examines the differences between African-
American and Euro-American ethos. He suggests that African-Americans value the
principle of self-determination and inclusive and communalistic approaches to deci-
sionmaking. Murray, supra note 123, at 37-39. Murray argues that the African-Amer-
ican patient's concept of him or herself as an individual is closely linked to the
African-American community. Id. at 40.
142. There are approximately two hundred Indian tribes in the United States. Na-
tive Americans live predominantly in the western states. Alaska, Arizona, California,
New Mexico, and Oklahoma have the greatest numbers of Native Americans. How-
ever, successful tribes have reclaimed their lands in Connecticut and Maine.
SPECTOR, supra note 5, at 216.
143. Wilkinson, supra note 126, at 32-33.
144. BULLOUGH & BULLOUGH, supra note 138, at 110.
145. See, e.g., Caresse & Rhodes, supra note 106.
1996] INFORMED WAIVER 1347
C. Secularism and Scientific Rationality
Western culture favors secular, rather than spiritual or emo-
tional, approaches to decisionmaking. It values the sciences and
the application of reason as a means of mastering the environ-
ment.146 Scientific rationality, the belief that all assumptions must
be capable of being objectively measured and observed, tends to
disregard emotional and social influences.14 7 Non-Western cultures
may view illness as resulting from social' 48 or supernatural
causes 149 and may advocate holistic solutions that consider all as-
pects of the patient's life.15°  Indeed, the folk sector in non-West-
ern communities is large.15 ' Moreover, conceptions of life, death,
and suffering influence how an individual deals with illness. The
146. This norm is grounded in the works of eighteenth century philosophers such as
Hobbes and Mill. Arras & Steinbock, supra note 6, at 25. It also informs the basic
premises of the medical perspective of health and illness including scientific rational-
ity, the emphasis on objective, numerical measurement, mind-body dualism, and the
emphasis on the individual patient, rather than on the family or community.
HELMAN, supra note 5, at 101. See also WILLIAMS, supra note 110, at 488 ("Very
broadly, emphasis upon science in America has reflected the values of the rationalis-
tic-individualistic tradition.").
147. HELMAN, supra note 5, at 101-107 (describing Western medicine's perspective
of disease in terms of Western dependence on scientific rationality).
148. Examples of commonly believed social causes of illness among some cultures
are witchcraft, sorcery, or the "evil eye." Id. at 69. Navajo Indians believe that witch-
craft exists and that witches can bring sickness to those that displease them. SPECrOR,
supra note 5, at 218. The Islamic tradition believes in the power of the evil eye. BUL-
LOUGH & BULLOUGH, supra note 138, at 124.
149. Examples of supernatural causes of illness are religion, spirits, and fate.
HELMAN, supra note 5, at 69. For example, the Hopi Indians associate illness with evil
spirits. SPECrOR, supra note 5, at 218. Many Black Americans belong to the Pente-
costal faith and other religious faiths that reflect a reliance on the healing powers of
religion. Id. at 195.
150. Holistic medicine considers the patient's relations with others, the natural en-
vironment, supernatural forces, and emotional symptoms. HELMAN, supra note 5, at
69. In African-American cultures, emotional expression may be strongly encouraged
and often serves as a tool for decisionmaking. Murray, supra note 123, at 40.
151. The folk sector includes individuals who socialize in either secular or spiritual
healing, or a combination of both. HELMAN, supra note 5, at 67. Although Native
American culture is extremely diverse and each tribal group has its own religion, folk-
lore, disease treatment and decisionmaking methods, most Native Americans believe
that health reflects life in harmony with nature and that opposing energies of the body
can be controlled by spiritual means. SPECrOR, supra note 5, at 217. Native Ameri-
cans may seek help from a shaman. HENDERSON & PRIMEAUX, supra note 11, at 136.
Mexican and Puerto Ricans often seek treatment from folk practitioners.
LINDENTHAL & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 15-16. One type of Hispanic folk prac-
titioner is the curandero/a. See SPECTOR, supra, at 283-87; BULLOUGH & BULLOUGH,
supra note 138, at 82-84. See also HELMAN, supra, at 68-72 (describing folk healers in
different non-Western cultures); BULLOUGH & BULLOUGH, supra note 138, at 130
(citing the Amish as a religious cultural group with a strong tradition of folk
medicine).
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idea that one can control pain or suffering is more compatible with
Western values of independence, active decisionmaking, and scien-
tific thinking than many non-Western beliefs that nature should
take its course or that suffering is a form of punishment imposed by
another. Chinese spirituality may promote a more passive ap-
proach to medical treatment evidenced by less emphasis on treat-
ment and life-prolonging measures. One Chinese writer sums up
the Chinese attitude toward life, illness, and death as follows:
"[t]reasure human life but do not attach to it."'1 52  Indians relate
life, suffering, and death to a higher source of good. They view
pain as a normal part of life and death as a natural event in every
person's life. When an Indian person is ill or dying, the main ques-
tion asked is whether their life was morally and spiritually mean-
ingful.' 53  Both Roman Catholic theology and folk medicine
influence Latin American beliefs about health and illness. Mexi-
cans, for example, view health as a gift from God and illness as a
consequence of immoral behavior. 154 Many African-Americans re-
tain traditional African beliefs in alternative medicine, including
magic and religion.' 55
D. Forthrightness
Western culture's vision of patients' self-determination and ac-
tive participation in medical treatment favors patient-physician
communication and physician disclosure of medical information. 56
152. Qui, supra note 126, at 170.
153. Mary F. Kodiath & Alex Kodiath, A Comparative Study of Patients Who Expe-
rience Chronic Malignant Pain in India and the United States, 18 CANCER NURSING
189, 195-96 (1995). In their comparative study of Indian and American cancer pa-
tients' experience of pain, Mary and Alex Kodiath discovered that differences in be-
liefs about life and death caused Indians to experience pain and then request medical
assistance whereas Americans immediately requested medical assistance. Id. at 192.
154. Antonia M. Villarruel & Bernard Ortiz de Montellano, Culture and Pain: A
Mesoamerican Perspective, 15 ADVANCED NURSING Sci. 21, 29 (1992) (studying be-
liefs related to the experience of pain in ancient Mesoamerica to establish a clear link
between cultural meanings and the expression of pain by contemporary Mexican-
Americans).
155. In sub-Saharan Africa, it is estimated that nearly eighty percent of black Afri-
cans employ alternative medicine either as the only form of health care available or in
combination with Western medicine. B.O. Osuntokun, Biomedical Ethics in the Devel-
oping World: Conflicts and Resolutions, in TRANSCULTURAL DIMENSIONS IN MEDI-
CAL ETHICS 105, 132-33 (Edmund Pellegrino et al. eds., 1992).
156. This value may be most clearly exemplified in the law of informed consent and
the 1990 Patient Self-Determination Act. See also George J. Annas & Frances H.
Miller, The Empire of Death: How Culture and Economics Affect Informed Consent
in the U.S., the U.K, and Japan, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 357, 361-62 (1994) (citing LYNN
PAYER, MEDICINE AND CULTURE 127 (1988) (linking the aggressive American ap-
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Non-Western cultures may prefer controlling the expression of
feelings, withholding negative medical information to protect sick
patients from anguish and sadness, and avoiding direct confronta-
tion. Asian culture highly values harmony and avoidance of con-
flict. 157  Many Japanese de-emphasize truth-telling and full
disclosure to patients for fear of causing unnecessary grief or disre-
spect. 158  Native American culture represents the most poignant
example of how a non-Western culture's beliefs may conflict with
Western notions of autonomy. In traditional Navajo culture, for
example, speech is a religious act that has the power to either heal
or harm.159 A recent study of informed consent at a Navajo reser-
vation medical clinic illustrated this belief and demonstrated that
laws requiring forthrightness about negative medical information
and risks of treatment were culturally troubling for Navajo physi-
cians and patients. 160
III. Including Cultural Difference in Practice
The Western conceptions of patient autonomy, as embodied in
the law of informed consent, do not apply universally.' 6' As a re-
proach toward medicine to the frontier spirit and to Americans' desire to problem-
solve)).
157. HENDERSON & PRIMEAUX, supra note 11, at 264-65.
158. See ANNAS & MILLER, supra note 156, at 374-75.
159. Anthropologist Gary Witherspoon writes that, according to Navajo belief,
speech and thought are religious acts that have the power to either heal or harm.
GARY WITHERSPOON, LANGUAGE AND ART IN THE NAVAJO UNIVERSE 28-29 (1977).
See also Carrese & Rhodes, supra note 106, at 826, 828 (stating that Navajos view
reality as a "mirror of language" and encourage thinking and talking "in the Beauty
way" (hdzh6), emphasizing positive, and avoiding negative, thought and speech).
For a detailed discussion of hdzhd, see WITHERSPOON, supra, at 18, 23-26.
160. In their study, Carrese and Rhodes found that discussing negative information,
in compaliance with the Patient Self-Determination Act, conflicted with the concept of
hdzhO and that such conversations were interpreted as potentially harmful by Nav-
ajo patients and informants. The Navajo study participants also expressed a discom-
fort with advance care planning discussions. Nineteen of the twenty-two informants
stated or implied that advance care planning was a dangerous violation of traditional
Navajo values. Ten informants refused to even discuss the issues at all because they
felt it was too dangerous. Carrese & Rhodes, supra .note 106, at 828.
161. Empirical studies also demonstrate that a theory of patient autonomy "which
premises that all people desire the same things and attempt to get them in similar
ways" does not pan out in clinical practice. Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics With a
Human Face, 69 IND. L.J. 1075, 1076 (1994). Schneider's article implies that this em-
pirical work underscores the role of cultural factors in patients' lives and urges
bioethicists and lawyers to "think more deeply, rigorously, and richly about the
problems of bioethics in general and about its autonomy paradigm in particular." Id.
at 1077. Similarly, Professor Susan Wolf argues that the field of bioethics, and to a
lesser extent, health law, is experiencing a shift from universalized and philosophical
abstractions toward context and "empirical realities." She credits this rise in empiri-
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sult, American courts' emphasis on the value of patient autonomy
often fails to address the experiences of individual patients in the
medical clinic. More significantly, by narrowly defining the scope
of autonomy in terms of Western values, and by monolithically ap-
plying a Westernized notion of informed consent, health law and
bioethics deprive non-Western cultures of their right to self-defini-
tion, and tend to devalue the notion of autonomy. It is possible to
advocate simultaneously for respecting cultural difference and to
recognize that there exist universal moral values. One such univer-
sal value is individuals' right to self-determination. The point of
self-determination in the medical context is that the patient has a
right to make a voluntary choice about medical decisionmaking
and treatment. It is not that every patient must inculcate the West-
ern notion and expression of autonomy.
As established in Part I, the law generally recognizes patients'
rights to control their own health care. The informed consent doc-
trine evolved from a right to be free from nonconsensual interfer-
ence with one's person 162 to a principle of patient autonomy. 63 A
patient-based, rather than physician-based standard for disclosure,
is approaching a majority position among jurisdictions. 164 Con-
gress requires physicians to facilitate some level of dialogue about
patient values through the Patient Self-Determination Act. More-
over, physicians' fiduciary obligation, requiring that they act exclu-
cism with the development of empirical studies, beginning in the 1980s, on a range of
bioethical topics. These studies produced significant data demonstrating that the pre-
dominant models of bioethical theory conflicted with the physician-patient experience
in the medical clinic. Wolf, supra note 5, at 403. See also Martha Minow, Who's The
Patient?, 53 MD. L. REv. 1173, 1177-78 (1994) ("[C]ross-cultural comparisons of medi-
cal practices indicate the great significance of family in many cultures and recommend
degrees of involvement and deference to family members in patient decisions that
might be deemed violations of patient autonomy in other contexts.").
162. See Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905). The battery standard used in
Mohr was overruled by Thor v. Super. Ct., 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993).
163. See Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
164. See 1 FURROW, supra note 3, at 414. Some commentators interpret Arato as
reaffirming the reasonable patient standard in California, supporting therapeutic dis-
cretion privilege, and ignoring the reality that some patients may want to avoid infor-
mation. See, e.g., id. at 427 (interpreting Arato as troubling because the court bent
over backwards to defer to medical practice and discretion). Others, however, argue
that Arato opened the door to greater physician obligations. Alexander Morgan
Capron goes so far as to suggest that Arato revealed that "the heart of the ... [pa-
tient's] claim goes beyond decisionmaking about chemotherapy and radiation to the
relevance of life expectancy information to Mr. Arato's general existence." See, e.g.,
Capron, supra note 66, at 13-14. He argues that a notion of informed consent based
on patients' rights to make decisions about their bodies is narrow, that informed con-
sent doctrine must require physicians to communicate and learn about their patients
as people, not merely as decisionmakers. Id.
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sively in patients' best interests, necessitates communication
between physicians and patients. 165 These communications enable
physicians to better understand their patients' concerns, and as a
result, assist them in evaluating their patients' best interest. Some
courts require physicians to provide additional information in or-
der to maximize patients' medical choices, 66 and to disclose pa-
tients' nonmedical interests such as physicians' research and
economic interests. 167  In addition, laws relating to surrogate deci-
sionmaking for incompetent patients provide a model for including
individuals other than the patient in the decisionmaking process. 168
Current law, however, does not explicitly recognize alternative
decisionmaking approaches for competent patients. At the heart
of the law guiding surrogate decisionmaking 169 and patients' right
to forego life sustaining medical treatment 170 remains the notion
that decisionmaking belongs only to the informed patient.' 71 A
doctrine of informed consent based on the broad principle of au-
165. This fiduciary duty includes an obligation to act exclusively in the patient's
best interests. Schuck, supra note 68, at 921 ("This duty underscores the purpose of
informed consent proper, which is not simply to provide information to empower the
patient to protect her own interests, but also, and perhaps more important, to further
the physician's responsibility to place the patient's interest above her own. Only
through dialogue with the patient can a physician come to understand the contours of
the patient's interests and thus, be in a position to help advance them.").
166. Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 906 (Cal. 1980) ("If the physician knows or
should know of a patient's concerns or lack of familiarity with medical procedures,
this may expand the scope of required disclosure.").
167. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 1990).
168. For a detailed discussion of the principles applied to proxy decisionmakers, see
2 FURROW, supra note 3, at 349-52, 369. See also Colleen M. O'Connor, Statutory
Surrogate Consent Provisions: An Overview and Analysis, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 128 (1996) (examining existing statutory surrogate provisions in
the U.S.).
169. Id.
170. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 & 277 (1990)
(finding that a competent adult has the right to choose to forgo life sustaining treat-
ment); In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534
N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988) (acknowledging a narrow right to refuse medical treatment); In
re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985) ("[T]he right to decline medical treatment
is, in any event, embraced within the common law right to self-determination.");
Bouvia v. Super. Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (applying principles of
informed consent to the right to forgo life sustaining treatment such as feeding and
hydration).
171. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (citing American Hospital Association statement
supporting the notion that "the controlling decision belongs to a competent, informed
patient.").
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tonomy requires explicit provisions that respect patients as choice-
making individuals and that honors patients' ultimate choices. 172
This section explores the ways to include patients' voices and
particular values in medical decisionmaking and proposes how the
law might recognize alternative decisionmaking approaches for
competent patients. First, it examines the applicability of the fed-
eral Patient Self-Determination Act (the "PSDA") and advanced
directives. Second, it considers the potential for health care prov-
iders to foster cultural sensitivity in medical decisionmaking.
Third, it concludes that courts must assume a leadership role in
promoting cultural accommodation in medical care by articulating
the concept of informed waiver that allows patients to opt out of
Western notions of informed consent.
A. The PSDA and Advanced Directives
The PSDA173and the case law affirming patients' rights to make
medical choices in accordance with their values represent how ex-
isting law might accommodate cultural difference. The PSDA re-
quires all Medicare and Medicaid health care providers to inform
patients of their right to make health-care decisions, to execute ad-
vanced directives, and to otherwise control their health care under
their respective state law.174 It supports cultural sensitivity by re-
quiring providers to specify explicitly, in their written policies, the
patient's right to make and express medical decisions consistent
with his or her values.175 In addition to the PSDA, living wills and
health care proxies document patients' values regarding death-de-
laying treatment and encourages patients to communicate these
wishes to their physicians and loved ones. Developing a similar
forum for initiating and recording dialogue with competent pa-
tients about the type of relationship they want to have with their
providers and about their preferred means of medical decision-
making upholds the notion of patient autonomy embodied in ad-
vanced directives. It also provides evidence of patients' choices
and physicians' compliance with those choices. Some legal and
medical commentators argue that compensation rates minimize the
172. KATZ, supra note 34, at 86 (writing that an adherence to the principle of au-
tonomy "is based on the assumption that many patients are capable of compre-
hending what they need to know in order to decide what is best for themselves and
that, therefore, they must be treated as adults possessed of the capacity for self-
determination.").
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (1994).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f), 1396a (w) (1994).
175. 2 FURROW, supra note 3, at 442.
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time providers can devote to a dialogue with patients176 and that
contemporary health care delivery systems assign enrolled patients
to a series of professionals that the patient does not know and who
do not intimately know the patient.177  For these reasons, physi-
cians should attach directives regarding medical decisionmaking
values to the patient's chart. This practice enables all the patients'
providers, with minimal effort, to know their patients' values re-
garding medical care. 178 Moreover, physicians and patients should
routinely reevaluate the status of patient directives to insure that
the document reflects the patient's current values.
Although many commentators herald advanced directives as
"magic bullets"'' 79 that ensure respect for a patient's values after he
or she becomes incapacitated, advanced directives pose problems
for accommodating a competent patient's desire to limit or dele-
gate his or her role in medical decisionmaking. First, the idea that
a competent person should delegate his or her right to be informed
or decide about his or her care is not expressly stated in statutory
language and case law. Indeed, the fact that physicians are uncer-
tain about how to relate to and include health care proxies for in-
competent patients'80 suggests that they might experience even
greater discomfort deferring to a competent patient's proxy. Sec-
ond, the style and substance of the PSDA and advanced directives
conflict with some cultures' unwillingness to talk about and plan
for adverse medical conditions. Third, despite public and profes-
sional education, few patients actually execute advanced direc-
tives.18' As a result, advanced directives may not provide the best
approach to including cultural values in medical decisionmaking.
176. See Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmak-
ing: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 379, 407 (1990);
Schuck, supra note 68, at 922.
177. See Schuck, supra note 68, at 926.
178. Peter Schuck suggests that physicians and patients contract about the patient's
preferred level of informed consent, A patient's directive about her values relevant
to her medical care may be viewed as an individual "contract" between the patient
and provider in ways similar to current advanced directives. Id. at 956-57.
179. Nancy Neveloff Dubler, The Doctor-Proxy Relationship: The Neglected Con-
nection, 5 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J., 289, 289 (1995).
180. Id.
181. According to recent data, only ten to twenty-five percent of older adults com-
pleted advanced directives. Id. at 291. See also Carl Schneider, Bioethics With A
Human Face, 69 IND. L. J. 1075, 1080 (1994) (examining empirical evidence that sug-
gests that individuals do not wish to make medical decisions and that bioethicists must
re-examine the autonomy paradigm).
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B. Health Care Providers and Bioethicists
The traditional culture of medicine has been described as "an-
tiparticipatory, heroic, interventionist, and paternalistic."'1 82 Physi-
cians historically placed greater emphasis on longevity, rather than
quality, of life for their patients. 183 With these factors in mind, it is
not surprising that medical education and practice have tradition-
ally not encouraged physicians to investigate and understand pa-
tients' cultural values. The Hippocratic Oath'8 mandating that
physicians above all, do no harm, and the renewed emphasis on
family practice, 85 however, encourage providers to sensitively and
comprehensively treat their patients.186 These themes represent an
invitation for physicians to increase their awareness of cultural dif-
ference in medical practice.
In addition, several bioethicists have re-examined the meaning
and scope of patient autonomy.1 87 They suggest that individuals
182. Patricia Peppin, Power and Disadvantage in Medical Relationships, 3 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 221, 224 (1994). Jay Katz explored the relationship between physicians
and patients and concludes that physicians never placed a premium on communicat-
ing with their patients, rather, the historical relationship is one of silent authority. He
wrote, "disclosure and consent, except in the most rudimentary fashion, are obliga-
tions alien to medical thinking and practice." KATZ, supra note 47, at 1.
183. KATZ, supra note 34, at 71.
184. Ludwig Edelstein, Ancient Medicine: Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein, in
ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE 54, 54 (John D. Arras & Bonnie Steinbock
eds., 1995) (reprinting the Hippocratic Oath).
185. In his best-selling book, Dr. Nuland offers the image of the family doctor as a
form of medical practice that historically encouraged physicians to comprehensively
treat patients. SHERWIN B. NULAND, How WE DIE 266 (1994).
186. Some commentators argue that the Hippocratic maxim to benefit patients is
ambiguous in cross cultural contexts because notions of benefit and harm have cultur-
ally specific meanings. John Carrese, Commentary, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 16 (July-
Aug. 1993).
187. Professor Edmund Pellegrino reconceives autonomy from a negative concept,
arising from a moral claim against intrusion of human rights, to a positive one. He
argues that the negative aspect of autonomy, prevalent in Western moral and political
philosophy, distorts the idea of patient autonomy by equating it with "total indepen-
dence from the physician or others in making treatment decisions." Pellegrino, supra
note 6, at 50. His positive model of autonomy implies an obligation to "foster the
human capacity for self-determination, to enhance it, and to remove obstacles to its
full operation." Id. at 49. He also argues that the moral principle of beneficence,
requiring one to prevent, remove, and to not inflict harm, is essential to the actualiza-
tion of autonomy. Id. at 51. Jay Katz places an even greater value on autonomy and
self-determination than Professor Pellegrino, but agrees that a singular application of
the principle is self-defeating. He writes that "abstract principles tend to express gen-
eralizations about conduct that are il-suited for application to actual cases in which
human psychological capacities to exercise rights must be considered." KATZ, supra
note 47, at 107. He proposes the concept of a "psychological autonomy" that requires
"self-reflection and conversation with others" to better understand the mechanics of
an individual's decisionmaking process. Id. at 111.
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express their autonomy in unique ways that vary with their prior
values and cultural, personal and social relationships, and that it is
beneficent and just to empower patients to express these values in
their decisions about medical treatment. They lend support for in-
clusion of cultural difference in the legal and medical contexts.
Other ethicists adopt a communitarian approach that questions
"both the rationalism of liberalism's approach to method and their
claim to value neutrality."' 88 Communitarians reject the predomi-
nance of individual rights in favor of shared values and goals of a
community. 189 Perhaps the strongest support for including cultural
difference is found in feminist and critical race ethics and theo-
ries.19° These approaches criticize the traditional autonomy model
of the genderless, raceless, and classless patient.191
In theory, bioethicists and health care providers can respect cul-
tural difference by initiating and endorsing guidelines and incen-
tives that encourage physicians to approach patients about their
cultural values. 192 They might advocate on behalf of their patients,
galvanizing their professional associations and institutions to de-
velop practice guidelines that explicitly recognize patients' cultural
values in medical care and decisionmaking. They might advise
medical schools to place greater emphasis on communication skills
and cultural awareness. 93 In turn, medical schools, residency pro-
188. Arras & Steinbock, supra note 6, at 26.
189. Id. at 27. See also articles in Individualism and Community: The Contested
Terrain of Autonomy, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32-35 (May-June 1994) (containing
three articles debating the predominance of the principle of autonomy in light of the
conflict between autonomy and community).
190. See generally Arras & Steinbock, supra note 6, at 28-30; Wolf, supra note 5, at
397-98 n.9, 401 nn.39-41 (citing principles posed by feminist and race attentive
literature).
191. See generally FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS (D. Kelly Weisberg
ed., 1993); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated
Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993).
192. Jay Katz proposes that "meaningful change can come about only through med-
ical education and the education of patients." KATZ, supra note 47, at 228-29. He
suggests an interactive model for informed consent that emphasizes dialogue between
physician and patient. Id. at 229.
193. Many medical schools offer "Introduction to Clinical Medicine" (ICM) as a
requirement of first and second year medical students. The course curriculum in-
cludes interviewing techniques and the impact of race, gender, and poverty on health.
Interview with Steven M. Wexler, M.D., emergency medicine resident at Bronx Mu-
nicipal Hospital Center and Lara Gordon, first-year medical student at SUNY Brook-
lyn Medical College in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 10, 1995). Bioethicists Robert D. Orr
and Patricia A. Marshall outlined guidelines for bridging the cultural communication
gap and for cross-cultural ethics consultations. Their suggestions for health care prov-
iders include making use of non-family translators, establishing liaisons with commu-
nity organizations, developing a resource list of hospital employees by ethnic origin to
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grams, and bioethical consultants can assist providers in devising
dialogues, questionnaires, and role-plays to ascertain patients' cul-
tural values and preferences regarding medical decisionmaking.
For example, when initiating a relationship with a patient, health
care providers might ask: "How do you feel most comfortable
making your medical decisions?"; "Can you describe your beliefs
about your family or community members' involvement in making
decisions regarding your care?"; or "Can you describe how your
cultural or personal values might influence your medical decision-
making?" One commentator suggests the concept of a values his-
tory,194 presented as either a written questionnaire provided to the
patient for completion and returned to the physician or a discus-
sion between the patient and physician, which is then recorded into
the patient's permanent medical record. Merely asking such ques-
tions implies a certain level of respect for patient values and non-
medical well-being. In addition, open-ended questions avoid
accidental disclosure of information perceived as intrusive or
harmful by some patients. Several bioethicists have written exten-
sively on reconceiving informed consent to include family and
shared decisionmaking. 195 Finally, providers might more fully inte-
grate social workers, nurses, psychiatrists, psychologists, and pa-
tient advocates as meaningful members of the health care team.
These disciplines have historically considered the impact of individ-
uals' cultural identity in their theory and practice, 196 and patients
may perceive these professionals as more closely aligned with their"
interests than physicians or bioethicists and may be more respon-
serve as cultural "informants," and directly questioning patients about who they con-
sider to be the appropriate decisionmaker and their views on involving spiritual and
religious advisors. Orr et al., Cross-cultural Considerations in Clinical Ethics Consul-
tations, 4 ARCH. FAM. MED. 159, 164 (1995).
194. See Ben A. Rich, The Values History: A New Standard of Care, 40 EMORY L.
J. 1109, 1141-52 (1991). Professor Rich proposes that the standard use of a values
history "naturally facilitates the recognition and exercise of patient autonomy." Id. at
1142. He also notes several studies reporting favorably on the use of values history
instruments. Id. at 1143 n.130. See also 2 FURROW, supra note 3, at 371-72 (describ-
ing the values history as a more comprehensive advanced care document that is likely
to be well-respected by most courts as a source of relevant information about the
patients likely decision).
195. See, e.g., Mark G. Kuczewski, Reconceiving the Family: The Process of Con-
sent in Medical Decisionmaking, 26 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30 (March-April 1996);
Minow, supra note 161.
196. See Schuck, supra note 68, at 938 (suggesting the use of specially trained
paraprofessionals to communicate with patients in ways physicians find difficult);
Jones, supra note 176, at 426 (proposing involvement of patient advocates); Steven R.
Smith, Mental Health Malpractice in the 1990s, 28 Hous. L. REV. 209, 258 n.302 (1991)
(suggesting role of patient advocate initiating and evaluating informed consent).
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sive to questions concerning their medical decisionmaking prefer-
ences and concerns. Physicians' concerns about their lack of time
to efficiently engage clients in such conversations are addressed by
delegating the task among interdisciplinary team members.
In contemporary medicine, characterized by the consolidation of
health care practices and industries in the race to compete in the
new era of managed care, health care providers possess a dimin-
ished ability to influence health management. The goals of man-
aged care, emphasizing cost-cutting, limitation of choice and
specialized care, rationing, and restrictions of physician autonomy,
significantly hinders physicians' power to guide medical decision-
making policy and hampers an interdisciplinary care team ap-
proach. In addition, today's physicians face pressure to see as
many patients as possible in the least amount of time.197 Requiring
that physicians investigate and consider patients' individualized
cultural values ignores the reality of contemporary medical prac-
tice where providers have limited, and uncompensated, time for
patient-physician dialogue.198 Inclusion of cultural difference re-
quires providing patients with opportunities to communicate their
subjective values,199 giving providers incentives to promote these
opportunities,200 and developing cost-effective ways of eliciting and
documenting patients' values. Although managed care companies
might be a vehicle for initiating culturally sensitive policies if the
practice proved competitively favorable to enlist particular client
populations, placing the burden of cultural inclusion on the medi-
cal community or market forces will probably not bring cultural
sensitivity to the clinic.
197. See Schuck, supra note 68, at 939-41 (offering a cost analysis of adherence to a
comprehensive informed consent doctrine).
198. Id. at 921-22 ("The physician incurs a cost for the time that she spends engag-
ing in a meaningful dialogue with the patient about risks... The fact that physicians
ordinarily are compensated by procedure rather than by time... also gives physicians
an incentive to minimize the time they spend on the procedure, including the time
they spend obtaining a patient's consent.").
199. As Professor Daar observes, "whatever a doctor reveals, the patient will ab-
sorb and process according to his or her own values.., a doctor simply cannot know
whether proffered (or retained) information is material only to a patient's treatment
choices." Daar, supra note 66, at 196.
200. See Jones, supra note 176, at 426, 430 n.124 (proposing compensating physi-
cians for dialogue with patients and citing statistics demonstrating that patients may
be willing to pay more money for physicians' time). See also Schuck, supra note 68, at
920-21, 938-41 (proposing increased cost-effectiveness of informed consent where in-
formed consent is obtained in a more contextual manner and if physicians and pa-
tients could customize their own informed consent models through contract).
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C. The Notion of Informed Waiver
The law clearly recognizes a patient's right not to receive infor-
mation.2 0 1 The right of patient waiver accommodates cultural dif-
ference where patients prefer not to hear risks of treatment. The
impact of waiver is that the patient remains the ultimate deci-
sionmaker about the process of medical decisionmaking. As a re-
sult, the notion of waiver upholds the values of self-determination
promoted by the doctrine of informed consent.2 °2
Alan Meisel identified two separate waiver issues: waiver of in-
formation and waiver of decision.20 3 A patient may waive his or
her right to know information relevant to medical care and a pa-
tient may waive the right to make a medical decision individually
or to make any decision at all. Patients favoring family and com-
munity-centered models of decisionmaking might waive their par-
ticipation in the decisionmaking process and delegate the right to
disclosure and decisionmaking authority to their families and
friends. Patients more comfortable with physician authority might
employ the waiver to defer medical treatment decisions to their
physician. Practically, physicians could record waivers in a pa-
tient's chart similar to the procedure for advanced directives. Un-
like advanced directives, however, the waiver would be effective
immediately and direct a physician's relationship with a competent
patient.
In order for a patient to waive his or her right to informed con-
sent, the patient must know that he or she has that right.2° The
patient must know that the physician has a duty to disclose infor-
mation relevant to medical treatment, that the law provides a right
to make a decision about that treatment, and that the physician can
not provide treatment without the patient's consent. Most signifi-
cantly, the patient must know of his or her right to waive. Just as
the law requires physicians and health care institutions to inform
the patient of his or her legal right to informed consent to treat-
ment, the law must obligate physicians and their employers to in-
form patients of the right to waive informed consent.
201. In the informed consent context, see Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 609 (Cal.
1993); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal. 1972) ("[A] medical doctor need not make
disclosure of risks where the patient requests that he not be so informed.").
202. See Meisel, supra note 100, at 459 ("A properly obtained waiver is completely
in keeping with the values sought to be promoted by informed consent.").
203. Id. at 453 n.133.
204. Id. at 454.
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Some commentators argue that imposing an obligation on physi-
cians to explain the legal right not to have information or to not
decide about treatment undermines the effect of informed consent
laws.2°5 They suggest that a patient might infer that he or she
should not want the information or that the physician seeks a way
around providing the information when, as a matter of law, the
patient is entitled to disclosure.206 Some suggest that patients
should be forced to discuss risks for their own therapeutic bene-
fit. 207 Some fear abuse of patient waivers by health care providers
and are reluctant to grant physicians such authority and discre-
tion.208 As a result, these commentators suggest procedures to pro-
tect patient interests that require institutional review committees
to review all requests for waiver.20 9 Others propose a conditional
obligation, imposing a duty on physicians to inform patients about
the right to waive only where the patient expresses a desire to re-
linquish his or her right to informed consent.210 Physicians and risk
managers might argue that informing patients of the right not to
decide or not to receive information is not clearly enough sup-
ported by existing law, and that it contradicts the explicit mandate
of informed consent. They might also criticize the wisdom of le-
gally permitting a competent patient to delegate decisionmaking
authority when physicians still have difficulties interfacing with
proxies for incompetent patients.21 '
205. Id. at 456 (analogizing "beginning Miranda warnings by informing the suspect
that although he has certain rights, he does not have to accept them, thereby under-
cutting the effect of the warning.").
206. Id.
207. Mark Strasser, Mill and the Right to Remain Uninformed, 11 J. MED. & PHI-
LOSOPHY 265 (1986).
208. BEAUCHAMP AND CHILDRESS, supra note 16, at 106.
209. Id.
210. Alan Meisel argues that physicians should not have an absolute obligation to
inform patients of the right to waive, but that a constitutional obligation should arise
where the patient expressly attempts to waive the right to either information or deci-
sionmaking. He proposes that statements such as "please don't tell me" or "you de-
cide" should "activate the doctor's duty to tell the patient that he has a right to the
information and a right to decide, but also has a right to not hear and not to decide -
that is, a right to waive." Meisel, supra note 100, at 456-57. See also ROBERT M.
VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS, 105-106 (1981) (recognizing the problems
with waivers and suggesting ways to respond to insure that the patient is voluntarily
making a decision not to make an informed decision). However, Veatch suggests that
there should be limited circumstances where information waivers are justified. Id. at
105-106 (citing examples of justified waiver where information giving would violate a
patient's religious or moral beliefs as in the case of a Jehovah Witness).
211. Dubler, supra note 176.
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Defining the right to waive as a separate principle, rather than
merely an exception to the doctrine of informed consent, permits a
broader legal vision of patient autonomy. Unlike the case of thera-
peutic privilege, the patient, not the physician, determines that dis-
closure or individual decisionmaking will be harmful. An explicit
right to waive informed consent creates a legal foundation for pa-
tients and physicians to choose alternative approaches to care with
greater comfort and becomes a vehicle for competent patients to
delegate decisionmaking and avoid hearing unwanted
information.212
Legal precedent and the litigious nature of contemporary medi-
cal practice, however, requires framing the right to waive informed
consent as a notion of "informed" waiver. Informed waiver would
obligate physicians to inform patients of the right to waive and the
risks of forgoing knowledge of medical risks. It is similar to the
doctrine of informed consent in that it requires both the physician's
disclosure of information and the patient's understanding of the
information. Some might argue that forcing patients into any style
of decisionmaking insists on Western values, emphasizing forth-
rightness and individualism. 213 The very act of asking patients to
individually decide whether they wish to delegate medical deci-
sions to a family member, for example, risks insensitivity to those
cultural norms favoring family and communal involvement. Some
might contend that there exists a fine line between the amount of
disclosure necessary for informed waiver and that required for in-
formed consent. Others might suggest that the notion of waiver,
even informed waiver, erodes the ability for sound decisionmaking.
Although informing patients of the risks of waiver invokes West-
ern-defined concepts, it represents a good compromise for includ-
ing multiculturalism in medical decisionmaking. It is difficult to
erase the impact of the patient rights movement and American val-
ues from American law and equally unrealistic to expect that phy-
sicians and their employers will embrace patients' ability to bypass
informed consent without protections against professional liability.
Perhaps, then, a law of informed waiver requires support by writ-
ten contract, documenting the physician's duty to inform patients
of the right to waive informed consent and the patient's intentional
and voluntary decision to invoke that right. An informed waiver
contract might mirror the forms physicians use when obtaining in-
formed consent. Courts might use informed waiver documents to
212. See Michel, supra note 21, at 25.
213. Id. at 26.
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guard against patients' hindsight change of position and to infer
individual patients' values regarding medical decisionmaking.
How might patients and health care providers employ a law of
informed waiver to accommodate cultural values in medical deci-
sionmaking? In practice, depending on constraints of time, the
physician might use the disclosure of the right to waive and the
presentation of an informed waiver contract as an opportunity to
engage the patient about his or her preferred approach to decision-
making. Patients can invoke the right to waive to prevent disclo-
sure of unwanted information, delegate the right to decide about
treatment, or to neither be informed nor to decide. Facilitating
patients' ability to make such decisions does not undermine sound
decisionmaking. Rather, it provides a good approach to fostering
self-definition and respecting human dignity.214
In the case examples provided in Part II, M.Y.'s physician might
inform M.Y. of her right to waive the right to decide unilaterally
and to hear information about the risks of medical procedures.
M.Y. could then choose, and possibly contract, with her physician,
to delegate the right to informed consent to a family member. A
law of informed waiver would allow M.Y.'s physician to respect her
choice of an alternative decisionmaking approach consistent with
her cultural values. As a result, M.Y. retains her right to autonomy
in the broadest sense. In the case of E.R., a law of informed
waiver might enable the clinic staff to accept more comfortably
E.R.'s choice of alternative treatment by decreasing the risk of pro-
fessional liability. E.R. might waive his right to know the particu-
lar risks of refusing the staff's recommended treatment if such
disclosure interfered with his choice to seek alternative care. He
might also waive his right to decide about his medical treatment
and, instead, defer this right to his community healer. At mini-
mum, a law of informed waiver, paired with the doctrine of in-
formed consent, might encourage the clinic staff to initiate dialogue
with E.R. about his cultural values and medical decisionmaking.
IV. Conclusion
The Western notion of autonomy, as reflected in the doctrine of
informed consent, assumes that individuals want to make decisions
about their medical care by themselves. Although the principle of
autonomy, as a broad principle of the right to free choice and
human dignity, is revered by many non-Western societies, each in-
214. Meisel, supra note 100, at 459.
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dividual defines autonomy according to his or her personal and cul-
tural values. Indeed, the very meaning of health and healing is
related to cultural values and these values often determine an indi-
vidual's approach to medical decisionmaking. A monolithic model
of informed consent falls short as a notion of choice and self-deter-
mination. Accordingly, this Note argues for a transcultural defini-
tion of patient autonomy that, in practice, empowers patients to
express themselves in ways germane to their worldview. It pro-
poses doing so through a doctrine of "informed waiver" that en-
ables competent patients to forego their right to receive medical
information and permits such patients to delegate medical deci-
sionmaking to others. Judges and legislators have struggled to de-
fine the doctrine of informed consent in a manner that reflects the
voice of the patient in medical decisionmaking. The proposed doc-
trine of informed waiver provides a means for patients who reject
Western-defined approaches to medical decisionmaking to realize
their autonomy in the fullest sense. If lawmakers fail to reform the
law regarding medical decisionmaking, if they neglect to consider
the impact of multiculturalism, the notion of autonomy will remain
a legal fiction for a significant and growing number of American
residents.
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